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ON NOT MAKING LAW
MITU GULATI* AND C.M.A. MCCAULIFF**
I
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario:
A three-judge panel on a federal court of appeals has before it a complex se-
curities law case.  Each of the three judges on the panel is a former criminal law-
yer.  Among the three, the only experience any one of them has with securities
law is a single course on the subject that one of them took thirty years ago.
The central issue in the case is both difficult and close.  Although there is no
useful case law on point, the issue frequently arises both in litigation and in prac-
tice.  Many cases have involved the issue, but each court has found an alternative
basis to decide the case before it, leaving the issue unresolved.  Presently, at least
two district court cases that raise a similar issue are on appeal in other circuits.  If
the panel tackles the issue squarely, its decision is likely to affect both the pending
litigation in those other cases and the behavior of corporate actors in future
transactions.
The judges do not have strong feelings about how the case should come out.
Each side has made out a strong case.  The judges are, however, concerned about
the amount of time and effort that writing an opinion in this case is likely to take.
Given the lack of expertise, the judges are each concerned about the errors they
might make in an opinion.  Errors here are likely to be costly not only because
the opinion will be binding precedent in this circuit, but also because the opinion
is likely to influence other circuits.  Furthermore, the judges on the panel do not
relish the prospect of receiving criticism from commentators, from panels in
other circuits, and worst of all, possible reversal by either an en banc panel or the
Supreme Court.  In sum, writing and publishing an opinion in this case has a
high downside and little upside.
                                                          
Copyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/61LCPGulati.
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
** Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; Golieb Fellow, New York University
Law School (1998-99).
We are grateful to Rick Abel, Samuel Alito, Jr., Morris Arnold, Stephen Bainbridge, Edward
Becker, David Binder, Evan Caminker, Devon Carbado, Paul Carrington, David Charny, Stephen
Gardbaum, Carole Goldberg, Jerry Kang, Dan Lowenstein, Sandra L. Lynch, Toby Milsom, Grant
Nelson, William Nelson, Richard Posner, Judith Resnick, Cruz Reynoso, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rick
Sander, David Shapiro, Seana Shiffrin, Clyde Spillenger, Kirk Stark, David Wilkins, Stephen Wilson,
and especially Stephen Yeazell, for their comments.  Responsibility for the views expressed, however,
lies solely with us.  We also thank participants in the Colloquium on American Legal History with John
Reid and Bill Nelson at NYU Law School for their comments.  Linda Carr O’Connor and Chris Cas-
selman provided invaluable assistance with collecting the data.
GULATI.FMT 04/01/99  5:01 PM
158 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 3
Given the high downside of writing and publishing an opinion in this case,
the panel decides to affirm the district court’s decision “without comment.”  In
other words, the panel decides not to make law.
What is an external observer to make of the above scenario?  The panel did
not explain why it chose not to provide an opinion in this case.  One is forced,
therefore, to hypothesize about what might have occurred within the black box
of the appellate panel’s deliberations.  As in the movie Rashamon, in which
each of the witnesses to a crime interprets differently what he or she saw, one
can tell the story of what the panel’s deliberations might have been from multi-
ple perspectives.  At the two ends of the spectrum of perspectives are the fol-
lowing two stories: one of legitimate behavior and the other of illegitimate.
Perspective A:  The panel may have determined that some procedural justi-
fication allowed it to avoid the difficult substantive law issues raised in the case.
For example, the issue may have been waived because it was not asserted prop-
erly.
Perspective B:  The panel may have decided (perhaps subconsciously and
without explicit articulation) that tackling the substantive law issues in the case
would take too much time and effort.  Furthermore, given their lack of exper-
tise in the area, the judges may have determined that any opinion they might
write posed a greater risk of confusing the law than of clarifying it.  “Perhaps,”
they may have thought to themselves, “it would be better to save our time and
effort for a case in which we can make good law.”  As for providing the parties
with justice, each side had made out a strong case and an affirmance may have
seemed just as fair an outcome as a reversal.
One might ask:  Why posit the second story?  After all, there are explicit
circuit rules that prohibit such behavior.  Would judges ever act in this manner?
Examining court norms or culture helps to answer these questions, which are
raised in our opening hypothetical.  This article begins by examining the Third
Circuit’s extensive use of the without-comment disposition from 1989 to 1996.
We ask the question whether, even among rational justice-seeking judges, a
norm could develop in which some fraction of the circuit’s hardest cases are
systematically disposed of without comment.  We argue that the nature of in-
centives and constraints operating on appellate judges makes the development
of this norm at least plausible.  The data on the Third Circuit’s publication
practices does nothing to dispel the hypothesis that such a norm might in fact
have developed.  It is, of course, possible that such a norm never developed—
and we have been told in no uncertain terms that such a norm never did and
never could have developed—but the problem with the use of the without-
comment disposition is that it does nothing to reassure the external observer.
The observer is left to guess about what might have happened.  The point is
that, in the absence of adequate external scrutiny—which dispositions such as
the without-comment disposition make nearly impossible—the only force that
would prevent such a norm from arising is a strong countervailing norm that
such behavior was unacceptable.  But how does one know whether such a coun-
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tervailing norm exists?  The lack of an answer leads to two options:  Either se-
verely curtail practices such as the use of the without-comment disposition—
practices that may bring efficiency gains—as the Third Circuit has done, or
generate enough information about the cultures and norms under which judges
operate to assure the public that judges are acting in a legitimate manner.1
Having argued that it is important to think about court norms, we describe
data on the publication practices of the various circuits.  The data suggests that
there are radical differences in the norms that exist across these circuits.  These
divergent norms mean that justice is being administered in significantly differ-
ent ways across the circuits in what is supposed to be a uniform federal court
system.
II
THE “WITHOUT COMMENT” DISPOSITION
There has been a dramatic increase in the federal appellate caseload since
the 1960s, estimated at as much as 1000%.2  The corresponding increase in the
number of appellate judges has been less dramatic—from eighty-eight in 1964
to 179 in 19973—leading to the much discussed crisis of volume.4  There are too
many cases and too few judges to decide them—at least in the manner cases
once were decided, when oral argument was heard and opinions were written in
every case.5  Constrained by a lack of resources, the circuit courts have turned
to shortcuts.  These include the denial of oral argument, judicial encourage-
ment to settle or use alternative methods of dispute resolution, the extensive
                                                          
1. For a recent example of work that thinks seriously about norms and judicial behavior, see
Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting on Multi-Member Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
Aug. 1999) (draft on file with authors).
2. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts,
1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25.
3. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 14, tbl.2-3 (1998) [hereinafter STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT].
4. See, e.g., id. at 13-17.  “Since 1960, circuit judgeships have grown by roughly 160%, but appeals
per judgeship have grown by 450%.”  Id. at 14; see, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON
APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31 (1994); FEDERAL CTS. STUDY COMM.,
JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109
(1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 132 (1996); Thomas E.
Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the “Crisis of Volume” in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (1994); Jonathan D. Varat, Determining the Mission and Size of
the Federal Judiciary via a Three-Branch Process: The Judges’ Debate and a Reform Menu, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 885, 887 (1995).
5. See Leonard I. Garth, Views from the Federal Bench: Past Present & Future, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1361, 1364 (1995) (recollecting that, in the early 1970s, judges on the Third Circuit heard oral
argument and wrote opinions in all of their cases); Walter K. Stapleton, Speech on the Federal Judicial
System in the Twenty-First Century, 14 THIRD CIR. J. 1, 4 (Issue 2, 1997) (describing the per-judge in-
crease in caseload—from approximately 90 in 1970, to above 400 in 1994—and the difficulty in giving
cases adequate attention).  For automatic appeals in criminal cases, see PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 76-78 (1976), commenting on Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and the
reversal of conviction after appointed counsel explained the hopelessness of the client’s position.
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use of staff attorneys and law clerks in the decisionmaking process, and the use
of short-form dispositions in place of published opinions.6
The short-form disposition shortcut has two basic versions: first, a terse,
not-for-publication opinion; second, a disposition without any comment what-
soever.7  A common characteristic of these short-form dispositions is that, while
rendering a decision on the merits of the case, they do not make law, that is,
such dispositions have no precedential value.8  This approach brings us closer to
the code systems of Europe in which case law plays a much less central role.
The resource-saving rationale is that, because the dispositions are not prece-
dential, judges can afford to spend less time crafting these opinions.9  The risk,
however, is that judges will be tempted to use nonprecedential short-form dis-
positions not only in cases that would not have created precedent even if dis-
posed of by a full opinion, but also in cases in which a full opinion would have
created precedent; after all, the harder the case, the greater the saving in judi-
cial resources.10  In addition, since the short-form dispositions have no (or neg-
                                                          
6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped
Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (1995); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Deci-
sions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging:
Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 37-51; Statement of the Honorable Joseph W.
Hatchett Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Mar.
23, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/atlanta/hatchett.htm> (describing the means used by
the Eleventh Circuit to keep up with its workload, which include “hiring a large staff of attorneys, en-
listing the services of visiting judges, and hiring more law clerks”).
The English system, which diverges considerably from ours, has continued to rely on oral argument
much more extensively than we do, although even in England it is decreasing.  Furthermore, English
judges may be seen to do justice when they render oral opinions from the bench after oral arguments.
See, e.g., JACKSON’S MACHINERY OF JUSTICE (J.R. Spencer ed., 1989); P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 277-79 (1987); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
JUDGE (1979); JACK I.H. JACOB, THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 19-20 (1987); JOHN
MORISON & PHILIP LEITH, THE BARRISTER’S WORLD AND THE NATURE OF LAW (1992).
7. See Baker, supra note 6, at 927-30; Dragich, supra note 6, at 763.
8. In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States formally resolved that publication would
be reserved for opinions having “general precedential value.”  JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11
(1964).  Each circuit thereafter adopted its own rules regarding nonpublication.  See Dragich, supra
note 6, at 762 n.17 (describing the different circuit rules governing the propriety of citing unpublished
opinions and noting that in a few circuits unpublished dispositions may be cited for certain specified
purposes).
We are aware of the debate over what a “precedential” opinion is.  In stating that precedential
opinions should be published, circuit rules typically draw a sharp distinction between opinions which
are precedential and those which are not.  In reality, however, the distinction is far from sharp, and one
might argue that every decision or even utterance by a court has a modicum of precedential value.  It
has been pointed out to us, therefore, that the real distinction drawn in the circuit rules between
precedential and nonprecedential opinions is the distinction between those opinions having substantial
precedential value and those that do not.  The data in Tables IV-XI, printed in the Appendix to this
article (see pages 211-23), suggest that different circuits make this judgment differently.
9. For a critique of this rationale, see William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evalua-
tion of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 573, 579-80 (1981).
10. See generally Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to In-
crease Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 441 (1988)
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ligible) precedential value, they are subjected to less scrutiny from the external
world (particularly commentators, lawyers, and other courts).11
In theory, internal circuit rules constrain the use of these short-form dispo-
sitions.  These dispositions are supposed to be used only in cases in which a
published opinion would have no precedential value—only in easy cases.12  The
problem arises at the margin, in cases in which it is unclear whether existing
precedent fully determines the outcome.  In such cases, as appellate panels ex-
ercise discretion in deciding whether an opinion would have precedential value,
room for abuse exists.13
Our central observation, however, is that it is short-sighted to focus on the
externally stated publication rules of the circuits and the minor expansions in
the interpretations of those rules.  We hypothesize that in practice these exter-
nally stated rules are not being observed.  Instead, the behavior of judges is
primarily governed by internally generated norms that can be altogether differ-
ent from the officially stated organizational rules.14  For us to understand publi-
cation practices, therefore, we should focus on the norms governing judicial be-
havior—that is, look beyond the formal rules on case disposition.15
Furthermore, to the extent the evolution of these norms across the circuits is a
response to the crisis in volume, the norms should converge across circuits to
the same group-welfare maximizing point.16  In practice, however, there is a di-
vergence in norms not easily explained by intercircuit differences in caseloads.
                                                          
(“Deciding cases without opinion greatly increases court output.”).  See also RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 126 (1985) (noticing that the “unpublished opinion pro-
vides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues under the rug, in cases where a one-liner would
be too blatant an evasion of judicial duty”).
11. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1200 (1978).
12. Judges and commentators commonly divide cases into the two broad categories of “easy” and
“difficult” for simplification.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 66
(1997); FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 275 (1994); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 132-33, 157, 161 n.1 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805-07 (1982).
13. Cf., e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 125 (noting that “some courts are silently deciding appeals
that twenty years ago would have been thought to merit a full opinion”); William M. Richman & Wil-
liam L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradi-
tion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1996) (discussing how little time judges spend on some cases,
particularly those in which no opinion is published).
14. Cf. GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 97 (rev. ed. 1974)
(defining a norm as “a statement specifying how one or more persons are expected to behave in given
circumstances, when reward may be expected to follow conformity to the norm and punishment devi-
ance from it.”); POSNER, supra note 4, at 167 (observing that although publication rules exist, courts
often ignore them).
15. Many articles discuss formal publication rules.  See, e.g., George C. Pratt, Summary Orders in
the Second Circuit Under Rule 0.23, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 479, 499-502 (1985); Reynolds & Richman,
supra note 11; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 9; David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977); Kerri L. Klover, Note, “Order
Opinions”—The Public’s Perception of Injustice, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1225, 1283-94 (1996).
16. Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167
(1991) (putting forward the thesis that norms in closely knit groups evolve toward the point at which
they maximize group welfare).  Professor Richard Abel has pointed out to us, however, that one com-
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Our study’s primary lens is the Third Circuit’s use of the without-comment
disposition, in the Third Circuit’s terminology a “JO” (an abbreviation for
“Judgment Order”), which was a significant method of disposition when we
undertook our study.17  From 1989 to 1996, the Third Circuit not only used the
JO in approximately sixty percent of its cases, but it also may have used the JO
in some of its hardest cases.18  By contrast, the majority of other circuits, while
using other short-form dispositions, almost never used the JO form of case dis-
position.19  We examined carefully both the evolution of this different norm in
the Third Circuit and its implications for the system.  Although the extensive
use of the JO is limited to a few circuits, other methods of short-form case dis-
position—such as signed, unpublished opinions or unsigned, unpublished
opinions—were used extensively by a few other circuits.  Some circuits did not
use short-form disposition at all.  Significant disparities in case disposition
methods and precedent creation thus exist across all circuits.  (Since 1996, how-
ever, the Third Circuit appears to have sharply curtailed its use of the JO.  The
percentage of cases disposed of without comment dropped from 62.3% in 1996
to 52.9% in 1997, and to 32.8% in 1998.  We have been informed that this per-
centage has dropped to below five percent in 1999.20)
A number of academics and judges have examined the implications of the
increasing use of short-form dispositions.21  The disposition without any com-
ment, although almost always condemned, has received minimal attention.22
The literature apparently assumes that, to the extent that the rules requiring
that short-form dispositions be used only in easy cases are not followed, the ex-
panded use of short-form dispositions occurs in cases at the margin—that is, in
the less difficult, not highly difficult, cases.23  There is likely truth to this sugges-
                                                          
ing from an anthropological rather than law and economics tradition might expect divergence rather
than convergence.
17. We use the terms “without-comment disposition” and “JO” interchangeably.  However, it has
been suggested that the terminology may not be as precise as we would like.  Apparently, the statistics
on without-comment dispositions produced by the Administrative Office of the Courts may include
dispositions on matters such as NLRB enforcement orders and pro se mandamus petitions in which
reasoned opinions are unlikely as a matter of course.  In addition, on circuits other than the Third Cir-
cuit, the JO can sometimes refer to a disposition that does have a minimal statement of reasons, such
as with the Supreme Court’s recent reversal of an Eleventh Circuit JO disposition.  See Haddle v. Gar-
rison, 119 S. Ct. 489 (1998).
18. See infra tbl. I, printed in the Appendix to this article (see page 208).
19. See id.
20. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1996-1998).
As far as we can tell, the norm shift on the Third Circuit is not a function of a change in caseload, but
of a voluntary shift in norms.
21. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4; Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One
Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986); Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Fed-
eral Appeals Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 (1994); Patricia M. Wald, The Prob-
lem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766
(1983).
22. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 6, at 927-28; Pratt, supra note 15, at 499-502; Robel, supra note 6,
at 50-51.
23. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 126.  See also William Glaberson, Case Load Forcing Two-Level
System for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1999, at 1:
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tion; as caseload pressures increase, judges will exercise their discretion to
move a larger number of marginal cases from the “hard—warrants published
opinion” category to the “easy—published opinion unwarranted or perhaps no
opinion” category.  In circuits in which an extensive use of the JO has become
acceptable, however, an alternative norm may have developed—or so we sug-
gest, based on a simple model of judicial incentives and constraints.  The risk of
rule violation is greatest not in the marginal, less important, cases, but in the
hardest or most difficult cases, cases in which an opinion would have far-
reaching effects in terms of influence.24
We examine several factors that might explain why judges use the JO in
their hardest cases, and we analyze these factors within an optimization model.
In this model, judges maximize happiness subject to constraints such as the
rules governing their behavior and caseload pressures.  Although as a formal
matter circuit rules constrain judicial behavior, the rules amount to little more
than statements of proper judicial behavior.  In turn, the real constraints on the
publication and case disposition practices of judges are informal.
Part III examines the incentives to use the JO (particularly in the harder
cases) and describes the basic data on the patterns of use of this method of dis-
position.  Judicial behavior is largely constrained by a combination both of in-
formal external and of internal monitoring and sanctioning.  In particular, there
is an absence of external monitoring of the use of the JO; this provides a strong
incentive to use the JO not only extensively, but also in the hardest cases.  Part
IV explores the costs and implications of this norm.  Use of the JO in certain
harder cases may not necessarily harm either the court’s performance of its er-
ror-correcting function or the development of precedent.  Nevertheless, other
possible detrimental effects include the risk that the use of the JO in hard cases
                                                          
Complex civil rights, antitrust, and other cases that appeals judges deem important get the
same detailed consideration as always.  But some judges and legal scholars say that entire
classes of appeals deemed routine, such as petitions from prison inmates and individuals’ dis-
ability claims under Social Security, get abbreviated attention as staff lawyers sort out cases
to recommend for full hearings.
24. Although we focus on the incentives to use the without-comment disposition in the hardest
cases, it has been suggested to us that a number of the short-form so-called “reasoned” dispositions
used by circuits such as the Ninth (which appear to give reasons in almost all of their cases) are, in ef-
fect, unreasoned dispositions.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support for Defendant-Appellant’s Peti-
tion for Rehearing and Suggestion of En Banc, United States v. Brian, 164 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Nos. 97-50285 and CR 75-783-RSWL) (on file with authors) (brief submitted by a group of law pro-
fessors and lawyers suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is using the equivalent of unexplained disposi-
tions in complex nonfrivolous cases); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 9, at 602 tbl.10 (finding
that approximately 34% of the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished dispositions failed to meet minimum stan-
dards of a reasoned disposition).  Nevertheless, we think there is an important distinction between dis-
positions that provide no reasons and those that provide some reasons, no matter how minimal.  As-
suming that the most minimal disposition is nothing more than an “affirmed based on the district
court’s rationale” or “affirmed based on our opinion in case x” there is still something that an expert
lawyer could work with in constructing an en banc or certiorari petition.  See, e.g., Haddle v. Garrison,
119 S.Ct. 489 (1998) (reversing an Eleventh Circuit judgment order where the Supreme Court was able
to discern the case on which the circuit court had decided to affirm).
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may create the perception that judges are not paying attention to litigants.25
Part V builds on the preliminary data on the use of the JO and looks at publica-
tion practices across the circuits.  The data suggest that there are significant
disparities in the publication norms across the circuits.
Finally, Part VI summarizes our observations and examines the need for
solutions.  Internal norm-based mechanisms may be the optimal form of con-
trol for both cost and efficiency for the circuits.  Therefore, we hesitate to rec-
ommend drastic reforms.  Indeed the practice that we focus on most critically,
the Third Circuit’s extensive use of the JO, appears to have been voluntarily
ended by the judges on that circuit.  Norm-based governance systems, however,
present problems, especially in the presence of externalities.  Nevertheless, we
are optimistic that providing judges with information about the harms certain
norms cause will alter these norms because judges do care about external per-
ceptions of their performance.
III
INCENTIVES TO USE THE JO: CONSTRAINTS AND GOALS
In theory, internal circuit rules prevent the use of the JO in hard cases:  In
general, rules require a written opinion when an opinion would add to or alter
existing precedent.26  These rules, however, are not rules in a conventional
sense.  Ordinarily, a rule is a prohibition on certain conduct accompanied by
both a formal policing mechanism and a set of sanctions.27  Neither of these ac-
companies the rules governing circuit court publication practices.  No external
body polices publication behavior, and there are no official sanctions attached
to failures to comply with the publication rules.  Litigants who observe rule
violations in their cases have no recourse and gain no benefit from pointing out
violations.  For example, an alternative system might entitle a litigant who re-
vealed failure to give reasons in a hard case to a rehearing of her case.  Such a
mechanism does not currently exist.  The publication rules are solely expres-
sions of desirable behavior.  Adherence to these expressions is assumed.28  Why
might we think that such a system could work?  What causes the system to
break down?
                                                          
25. See STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that the use of a “less
than fully reasoned opinion or cryptic [JO], raises apprehensions as to the degree of attention those
appeals actually receive from judges themselves”).
26. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 281-82.
27. See ELLICKSON, supra note 16, at 128-29 (describing the characteristics of a rule); Lawrence
Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.  661, 662 (1998) (describing the characteristics of
a law).
28. In Ellickson’s terminology, these circuit rules are no more than “aspirational statements.”
ELLICKSON, supra note 16, at 129.  For discussions of the expressive function of law, see Robert
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regula-
tion of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1008-14 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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A. Rule Constraints: External Scrutiny and Reputational Sanctions—What
Everyone Talks About
Given the restrictions on their ability to earn income from outside activities,
judges are likely motivated by more than maximizing their personal wealth.29
They may seek to consume certain minimal amounts of leisure, but this does
not seem to be a driving force for these individuals.30  Judges do, however, care
a great deal about reputation, prestige, esteem, and status.  Acquiring reputa-
tion can be a goal in and of itself.  In addition, judges have institutional reasons
for wanting the judiciary to be held in high esteem—the judiciary’s effective-
ness and power is, in part, a function of the trust the public has in it.31  Judges
may care about power and effectiveness because they gain utility from further-
ing their ideas or normative views of the world.32  Alternatively, power and ef-
fectiveness are required for judges to do their jobs well, which may provide
utility as well.33  Therefore, judges have both personal and institutional reasons
for preserving their reputations for adhering to rules.34  Being detected violat-
ing their own public rules of behavior, in theory, should hurt the reputation of
both individual judges and of courts as a whole.  After all, how can judges be
trusted to apply the law to others’ cases if they do not follow their own rules?
One might think, therefore, that absent a rule permitting the use of the JO in
hard cases, the fear of reputational sanctions would keep judges from using the
JO in such cases.
                                                          
29. See Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis
of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 738 (1993); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4-7 (1993).
30. Richard Posner suggests that a number of those selected to be judges will have already inter-
nalized strong work norms at the point of being appointed.  See Posner, supra note 29, at 11-12.
31. The “judicial effectiveness” rationale for constrained decisionmaking by judges is most closely
associated with Alexander Bickel, who argued that to preserve its legitimacy and power, the Court had
to exercise better judgment (in a political sense) in deciding what cases to accept.  See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 30-31
(2d ed. 1986) (1962).  On Bickel and his jurisprudence, see Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial
Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM. HIST. 125 (1992); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be
Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998).  Judge Posner sug-
gests that judges invented the category of “advisory opinion” in order “to reduce their work, as well as
to avoid the hassle involved in wrestling with difficult, politically sensitive issues.”  Posner, supra note
29, at 21.
32. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (hypothesizing that judges opt for discretion-loaded procedural rules
that not only enable them to consume more leisure, but also to reach legal results that further their
view of the good).  Judge Posner has described the utility judges derive from doing their job well as
akin to the pleasure of playing a game:  Whether one plays to win or for the pleasure of playing, one
plays according to the rules or one is not playing the game.  See Posner, supra note 29, at 30 (“[T]he
judge must play by the rules of the judicial game, because the rules constitute the game.”).  For a re-
cent empirical study of the variables that influence judges, see Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the In-
fluences on the Judicial Mind, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1383-84 (1998).
33. One might derive utility from fulfilling one’s socially constructed role and identity.  Cf. Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (discussing the influence of
social norms and roles on behavior).
34. The likelihood of collective action problems is diminished by the team or group-oriented na-
ture of appellate decisionmaking.  See infra text accompanying notes 38-51.
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As with any sanctioning mechanism, however, the effectiveness of sanctions
depends not only on the severity of the sanction, but also on the likelihood of
detection.  Courts do give reasons for the outcomes they reach even in unpub-
lished opinions.  An external observer—a litigant or researcher—can examine
these reasons.  If the reasons implicate important issues and do not follow from
existing precedent, it can be discovered.  Detection of rule violations may be
difficult and expensive—especially if the opinions are not placed online35—but,
as the growing literature on the subject of unpublished opinions attests, rule
violations can be detected.36
Abuses of the rules governing the JO are especially hard to detect, however.
In a JO, no reasons are given at all.  An outside observer must consider all the
possible reasons for the disposition.  To find a violation, the observer must con-
clude that the court could have no set of reasons that are nonprecedential—a
nearly impossible task given the range of possible nonprecedential rationales,
procedural and substantive, that arguably could have justified an affirmance.
To some extent, courts are limited to the arguments raised by the parties, but
courts can raise some arguments themselves.  In addition, the lengthy briefs in
well-argued cases often suggest numerous possible avenues to reach an out-
come, at least one of which is likely to be both plausible and nonprecedential.
In short, it is difficult even for someone with a high level of knowledge of both
the circuit’s substantive and procedural law to state conclusively that the use of
the JO in a particular case constituted a rule violation.  The appellate court’s
failure to give reasons makes it extremely difficult to assert error.  The fact that
no law was made also makes it unlikely that either the circuit en banc or the
Supreme Court will grant review.37  In sum, the external monitoring mechanism
is not sufficient to prevent abuse of the JO, creating a situation of de facto non-
reviewability.
B. Internal Scrutiny and Social Sanctions: The Constraint With a Bite
An effective internal monitoring mechanism to detect overuse of the JO
does exist, however, because appellate judges work together, not as individuals.
In general, circuit courts hear and decide cases in panels of three judges.38  Cir-
                                                          
35. See, e.g., Kirt Shuldberg, Note, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 567 (1997).
Some circuits make external scrutiny of unpublished opinions more difficult by not placing them on
WESTLAW or LEXIS/NEXIS.  Nevertheless, these opinions are matters of public record and with
persistence are obtainable from the court.
36. See, e.g., Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication,
Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 128-30 (1995) (identifying examples of
cases in which unpublished dispositions should not have been used); cf. Edward A. Adams, Increased
Use of Unpublished Opinions Faulted, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at 1, 4 (quoting Judge Wilfred Feinberg
to the effect that the JO and summary orders in general could be a means for “sweeping tough deci-
sions under the rug”); Robel, supra note 6, at 52.
37. See Robel, supra note 6, at 52.
38. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 82
(1986) (pointing out that while appellate decisionmaking is essentially a group process, most theories
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cuit court judges are generalists, not specialists.  Because the judges perform
identical tasks, have similar qualifications, and make their decisions in teams
with shifting composition, internal cross-monitoring could be effective.39  The
judges on a panel know when a JO is used in an especially hard case:  The three
judges discuss the reasons (or lack thereof) for the disposition.  If the practice
of using the JO to avoid deciding hard cases is widespread, all of the judges on
the circuit will be aware of it.
An internal monitoring mechanism alone, however, cannot deter improper
or deviant behavior.  Detection has to be accompanied by sanctions.  Within
the federal circuits, nonlegal, social-sanctioning, internal mechanisms are effec-
tive because the courts are small, closed, “collegial” communities composed of
professionals who interact repeatedly.40  The option of exit is limited, obviating
the need for a costly, formal policing system.  In a closed community, social
isolation and the cost of losing respect can be significant enough to constrain
behavior.  Judges are also constrained in their social interactions with the out-
side world:  They have only their clerks and one another with whom to discuss
their cases.  Even if some social interaction with the outside occurs, the outside
world understands and cares little about the workings of the circuit courts
(especially by comparison to the Supreme Court).
The cost of social isolation by and losing trust with the judge’s peers is likely
to be high in the circuit court community.  Nevertheless, these costs do not fully
capture either the importance of nontransactional conflicts of interest41 or the
                                                          
“neither explain the group nature of the process nor take it into account”); Caminker, supra note 1
(same).
39. See, e.g., Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 801, 816 (1992) (examining the contexts in which mutual monitoring is likely to be effective).
Although law clerks are uniquely suited to monitor their judges, given their lower status in the court
hierarchy, their low level of knowledge, and their professional dependence on the judges for job rec-
ommendations, they are unlikely to raise more than mild objections to their judges’ actions.  Clerks’
disapproval is likely to have far less influence on the behavior of a judge than criticism from a fellow
judge.
40. The ideal court has been described as a “cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with
one another’s ways of thinking, reacting, persuading, and being persuaded . . . an institution—an incor-
poreal body of precedent and tradition, of shared experiences and collegial feelings.”  Statement of the
Honorable Edward R. Becker before the Comm. on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Ap-
peals (Jan. 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork/0424BEC> (quoting the com-
mission language from the commentary in a prior report).  Needless to say, there are some who argue
that there is not much collegiality left on today’s Courts of Appeals.  See Statement of Professor Wil-
liam M. Richman Before the Comm. on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals (visited
Feb. 17, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/chicago/richman.htm> (noting that “collegiality
on the modern circuit court is probably a myth anyway”).
The isolated group characteristic of a circuit is altered somewhat in those circuits that make exten-
sive use of visiting judges.  Cf. Statement of Professor Judith Resnick before the Comm. on Structural
Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals (Apr. 24, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/
newyork/0427RES.htm> (urging that those who study the federal courts of appeals take into account
the extensive use of visiting judges on a number of the circuits).
41. David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1841, 1845-46 (1996), divides nontransactional conflicts into “common pool” and
“external harms” conflicts.  In common pools, conflicts arise among participants who all draw from a
common resource that may be destroyed unless the participants’ behavior is regulated.  In an external
harms conflict, parties do not routinely deal with each other, but are in a relationship in which, like
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importance judges attach to the esteem in which other judges on their circuit
hold them.42  First, although judges often differ in policy preferences or judicial
philosophies, they depend on one another for baseline levels of accuracy in
citing cases, checking applicable precedent, and not camouflaging their policy
preferences in footnotes or elsewhere.  If a judge violates existing norms and
loses trust, his or her work will be scrutinized more carefully by the others.  For
example, ambiguous language in an opinion will be viewed with more suspi-
cion—perhaps as representing a hidden agenda—and clarification will be re-
quested.  Second, losing trust constrains a judge’s ability to compromise and
negotiate with other panel members when deciding cases, increasing the cost of
decisionmaking.  Judges often negotiate over the language to be used in an
opinion—especially in circuits in which there is a norm disfavoring dissents—
and a loss of trust inhibits these negotiations.  Third, as with ostracism in any
small group, social sanctions against a judge are manifested in many ways,
ranging from being unable to discuss issues and problems in cases with col-
leagues (who may either have a different perspective or know a particular sub-
ject better) to being excluded from social gatherings.
In theory, official circuit rules on the use of the JO and other rules on publi-
cation practices are the circuits’ expression of proper conduct.  After Congress
delegated rulemaking authority to the circuits, each circuit formulated its own
publication rules.  If it is possible to detect deviations from these rules (which
permit the use of the JO only in easy cases), sanctions should result.  For the
repeat offender, negative gossip will be followed by social ostracism.43  The
threat of these internal social sanctions should deter most serious deviations
from the official rules even if external scrutiny and sanctions are absent.
The published rules of a circuit, however, may not be amenable to change
for a variety of reasons, including fear of external criticism and difficulties in
arriving at consensus.  The rules may therefore become stuck at what may have
become suboptimal points, even if they were once optimal.  Norms, in contrast,
are flexible and constantly evolving.  Circuit rules may have, at one point in the
past, represented a group consensus on acceptable behavior.  If external scru-
tiny of internal norms is negligible, however, and alteration of externally stated
rules will bring on criticism, a circuit’s internal norms may evolve away from
                                                          
neighbors, they can occasionally harm each other.  See id; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing common
pool problems); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697
(1996) (discussing external harm problems).
42. On average, judges attach importance to what their colleagues think of them.  Cf. Robert C.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 537, 541 (1998)
(describing the importance of considering the human quest for status); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997) (setting forth an
“esteem” theory of norms).
43. On the importance of gossip, shaming, and ostracism in enforcing social norms, see Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 373-89 (1997); Richard
H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1996).
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the externally stated rules.44  In cost-benefit terms, the lack of external scrutiny
means that internal norms will be altered to maximize the welfare of the group
without taking costs to others into account (unless the externalities figure into
the judges’ individual utility functions).  In the meantime, the statement of
rules visible to external observers remains unchanged.45
The contemporary “law and norms” literature is only beginning to ask and
answer questions about how norms develop and whether they are efficient.46
While it is possible, as Professor Ellickson suggests, that norms in closely knit
groups develop to maximize group welfare, it is also possible that other factors
such as path dependence or unusually powerful subgroups may push norms to
suboptimal equilibria.47  In addition, depending on the extent to which judges
on a circuit care about, comprehend, and internalize the external costs and
benefits to society of their norms, the norms will move closer to or farther from
their societally optimal point.
We make no claim to be adding to the theoretical literature on norms and
social sanctions.  This fledgling, though fast expanding, literature, however, has
helped shape our observations about the publication practices of the circuits.
First, the small, closely knit group characteristic of the circuit courts suggests
that the absence of a formal external monitoring and sanctioning mechanism
for rule violations alone is not problematic.  Social sanctions in a closely knit
                                                          
44. We distinguish between formal organizational rules (which some commentators treat under
the rubric of norms) and informal conventions about acceptable behavior, referring to the latter as
norms.  For an example of the former, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Re-
thinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).  On the dis-
tinction, see McAdams, supra note 42, at 350-51.
45. Because internal norms can differ from the rules stated externally, individual judges on a cir-
cuit may disapprove of the practice of using the JO in hard cases, but nevertheless have to accept it.
Objecting to a colleague’s desire to use a JO in a hard case may produce sanctions, such as being as-
signed to write the opinion oneself.
46. On this expanding literature, see Lessig, supra note 27; McAdams, supra note 42; Richard A.
Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997).
Professor Macaulay had pointed to the importance of informal social sanctions in ordering contrac-
tual relationships at least two decades before work along these lines showed up in the law and eco-
nomics literature.  See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63-64 (1963).  Indeed, as Professor Marvin Harris pointed out to us, one can
trace the discussion of how societies function without the statal apparata of legal codes, police, jails,
and other such mechanisms to 19th century evolutionists such as Lewis Henry Morgan, Sir Henry
Maine, Marx, and Engels.  See, e.g., MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (4th ed. 1995);
MARVIN HARRIS, OUR KIND: WHO WE ARE, WHERE WE CAME FROM AND WHERE WE ARE
GOING: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN LIFE AND CULTURE (1989).
47. See generally Posner, supra note 41.  On path dependence, see Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe,
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE TODAY: VENTURE CAPITAL, HIERARCHIES & BOUNDARIES, THE BOARD, EMPLOYEES,
THE CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGM, EUROPE AND JAPAN 565 (1998).  Bebchuck and Roe explain that
although economic analysts expect corporate ownership and governance structures to converge effi-
ciently, neither rapid nor complete convergence will necessarily take place in fact:  “Corporate gov-
ernance is not a technology, like, say, inventory control, which if used sub-optimally will lead capital
and product markets to punish the recalcitrant.”  Id.  The legal system and judicial discretion are even
less susceptible to the pressures of the marketplace.  See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial
Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 INT’L REV L. & ECON. 169, 169-70 n.3 (1992).
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group whose members repeatedly interact are likely to be highly effective.48  If
these informal nonlegal sanctions work effectively, an expensive, formal en-
forcement system may be unnecessary.49
Nevertheless, we need not and should not leave the system alone—an im-
portant role for the external observer and even the government still exists.50  In
addition, if external monitoring is negligible or minimal, we should not be sur-
prised to see internal norms of behavior evolve away from externally stated
rules.  However, the closely knit structure of a circuit court may mean that de-
viant behavior is both easily detected and penalized through an informal
mechanism, but what the judges consider to be deviant behavior may differ
from that identified by the formal rules.
For sources of data on norm-dominated behavior, we have a valuable labo-
ratory: twelve circuit courts, each doing essentially the same work and each a
small, closely knit group of self-governing individuals with high levels of infor-
mation and similar qualifications.  No doubt differences between the circuits
exist, but in the social sciences, it is rare to find controlled experiments.51
C. What Motivates Appellate Judges?
Judges, like everyone else, pursue goals subject to constraints.52  Important
constraints include the burdens of an overwhelming caseload and the circuit
rules governing the disposition of those cases, especially the rules governing
publication practices.  We began this article by hypothesizing a difficult and
important case in which a panel chose not to provide reasons for its decision.
                                                          
48. Judge Selya, for one, suggests that the primary check on the publication behavior of judges is
peer pressure from within the circuit, and not pressure from the outside.  See Selya, supra note 21, at
412.
49. Cf. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1990) (analyzing nonlegal sanctions in a commercial context).
50. Although the internal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms of the circuits may be more ef-
fective, the presence of at least minimal external monitoring is important to ensure that the judges do
not ignore externalities.  Cf. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) (examining the interaction of
legal and nonlegal sanctions).
51. Law and norms scholars have looked far and wide, to among others, communities of cattlemen
in Shasta county, diamond merchants in New York, 18th- and 19th-century whalers and duelers, bee
keepers, and Chinese middlemen in Asia.  See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extrale-
gal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Steven N.S. Cheung,
The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 30 (1973); Robert C. Ellickson,
A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
83 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Mid-
dleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Warren F.
Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984).
52. Cf. Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 941, 946 (1995) (criticizing Richard Posner and Duncan Kennedy for not adequately consid-
ering constraints in their models of judges as free, preference-maximizing actors); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605 (1995) (using a model in which “the optimal structure of the judicial system is
determined by the extent of a resource constraint . . . the flow of cases into the system, and the diffi-
culty of law-finding”).
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To the extent the panel had no procedural justification for its failure to write
and publish an opinion, this disposition would appear to be a violation of the
rules governing nonpublication as well as an extreme departure from the role
of an appellate judge, as taught in law schools—to write opinions in hard
cases.53  Violating rules and departing from traditional roles, however, are
hardly behavioral patterns expected of federal appellate judges, a group charac-
terized by its inherent institutional conservatism.54  We have no reason to think
that judges on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, whose use of the JO is our
primary focus, are less institutionally conservative than judges on the other cir-
cuits.55  What explains our claim that it is legitimate to ask whether the Third
Circuit’s judges were disregarding rules and traditional roles?  An examination
of the incentives to use the JO provides some answers.
The obvious criteria of economic analysis—income, wealth, and job secu-
rity—are of little use to our exercise.  Federal judges have lifetime appoint-
ments, and are virtually unthreatened by job loss.  Their income is independent
of performance; it is not, for example, tied to reversal rates, number of cita-
tions, or number of published opinions.56  In addition, judges are restricted in
the income they may earn from outside activities.57  Although a fraction of ap-
pellate judges would possibly like to be elevated to the Supreme Court, the
likelihood of elevation is minuscule, and it is unclear if there is anything a judge
could do in his judicial behavior to raise his chances.58  The same would seem to
apply for the few positions in government attractive enough to induce a federal
judge to resign, such as an ambassadorship or a high cabinet position.59
                                                          
53. See, e.g., WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE
ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 4-5 (1997) (describing the importance of the
judicial opinion); Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of
Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 225, 247 (1985); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 278-79; James
Boyd White, What’s an Opinion for?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1995) (“The opinion . . . is central
to the activities of mind and character of the law as we know and value it.”); Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) (failure to provide reasons is a departure from the conventional
appellate ideal and that departure, in and of itself, brings on criticism); A.W. Brian Simpson, The
Judges and the Vigilant State, 1989 DENNING L.J. 145, 147 (listing the contributions of the judiciary,
including “the notion of a fair trial, or access to the law, of openly administered justice, of rational de-
cisions in conformity with professional tradition”).
54. That inherent conservatism is perhaps best exemplified by the dominance of stare decisis,
which emphasizes maintaining the status quo and disfavors innovation.
55. As far as we know, the Third Circuit’s judges, unlike judges on some other circuits, are not
characterized either by unusual innovation or disinclination to follow precedent.
56. See Posner, supra note 29, at 4-7.
57. See 5 U.S.C. app. 7, §§ 501-505 (1994); Patricia Wald, Some Real-Life Observations About
Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173, 178 (1992) (noting the restrictions on judges earning outside income).
58. See Posner, supra note 29, at 5.  But cf. S. Scott Gaille, Publishing by United States Court of
Appeals Judges: Before and After the Bork Hearings, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371-72 (1997) (finding
that judges published fewer books and articles in the aftermath of the Bork hearings and suggesting
that the reason for this drop in publication was the fear that a publication record was likely to hurt an
appellate court judge’s chances of elevation).
59. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions 14 (Aug. 31,
1997) (unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association, on file with
authors).
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Indeed, federal judges appear to care little about increasing their income
levels, at least not at the cost of their judgeships.60  For example, although a
federal judge’s pension almost approximates the salary of an active judge, few
judges retire at age sixty-five for a higher paying job in the private sector.
Similarly, while judges are often accused of voting on the basis of political and
policy preferences,61 accusations of bribery and corruption on the appellate
bench are rare.
We are left, therefore, with one primary variable from economics—
leisure—and a set of variables associated more with sociology and anthropol-
ogy than economics.  These other variables include reputation, prestige, status,
esteem, the furtherance of political or policy views, and role fulfillment.  Con-
ventional economic analysis tends to ignore all these variables, except perhaps
reputation, which it treats as a means to achieve wealth maximization.62  With
appellate judges, these secondary variables come to the fore.63
Does it serve any purpose to generalize about the factors that motivate fed-
eral appellate judges?  After all, unlike the economic class of “laborers,” for
example, the number of appellate judges is small—approximately 18064—and
each judge is likely motivated by a different combination of the listed factors.65
For example, one judge might care greatly about furthering a political agenda,
whereas another may care only about fairness to the parties.66  Similarly, some
judges may care primarily about their reputation with legal academics while
others might care more about their status in the local bar.67  The importance of
these individual differences, however, is dampened by the fact that the behav-
                                                          
60. See Cass, supra note 52, at 970-71.
61. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 23 (1998); JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 1 (1993); Wil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L.
& ECON. 249, 272-73 (1976) (describing the desire to impose one’s normative views on society as a mo-
tivating factor for judges).
62. Cf. Charny, supra note 49, at 412-20 (discussing the acquisition of reputational capital to fur-
ther commercial relationships); Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the Antidis-
crimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1087-88, 1091 (1995) (criticizing Rich-
ard McAdams’s relation of status maximization to labor market discrimination).
63. See BAUM, supra note 12, at 42-47; Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Inde-
terminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1940-41 (1998) (stating that judges are
“motivated mainly by nonpecuniary rewards, such as prestige, challenge, and a sense of serving soci-
ety”).
64. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J.
1147, 1163 (1994); cf. Resnick, supra note 40 (asserting that when one includes senior judges and visit-
ing judges, the true number of appellate judges is at least 266 (who are assisted on occasion by another
323 district judges)).
65. A number of studies have documented a wide variation in judicial goals.  See, e.g., BAUM, su-
pra note 12, at 24 (citing studies).
66. Cf. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeals,
39 J. POL. 916 (1977) (studying the relationship between judges’ role conceptions and their voting be-
havior).
67. See BAUM, supra note 12, at 54; cf. HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 32-33 (1992) (describing research on appellate judges which shows significant differences in
the audiences for whom judges see themselves writing); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION 132-34 (1990) (describing Cardozo’s focus on the academic audience).
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ior of judges is subject to highly effective, albeit informal, group constraints.
The incentives of judges on a circuit to use the JO, therefore, can be discussed
in terms of the incentives of the group.
D. Goal Optimization Subject to Constraints: Too Much Work, Too Little
Time—The Caseload Constraint
How might the extensive use of the JO, including its use in hard cases, fur-
ther the goals of the judges on a circuit?68  Appellate judges solve their optimi-
zation problem under two primary sets of external constraints: first, an unman-
ageable caseload,69 and second, rules about the disposition of cases (for
example, when publication is required, or when a minimal statement of reasons
is sufficient).
The JO’s obvious benefit is that it saves more time than the other short-
form dispositions because the panel gives no reasons at all for its disposition.70
Even in an easy case, a JO saves time because drafting a minimal statement of
facts, issues raised, and reasons why the claims fail takes a few hours, if not a
day or two.  Drafting a JO, on the other hand, takes no more than a few min-
utes to complete.71
The real savings in time and resources with a JO is in a hard case.  Take, for
example, our hypothetical securities case that raised a difficult issue for which
there were strong arguments on both sides.72  On the basis of an initial evalua-
tion of the briefs, the judges could not decide either how the doctrine should be
shaped or which side should win.  Based on this minimal, initial evaluation—
the first reading and evaluation of the briefs—the case was too close to call.
Deciding the case and, more importantly, explaining the rationale for the deci-
sion, would take a great deal of time and effort by the judges.  Avoiding an
opinion with a JO would save time and effort.  The two other short-form dispo-
sitions, the unsigned and signed unpublished opinions, by contrast, both still
require some reasons; the panel’s problem is precisely that it neither has the
reasons nor the time to find the reasons.
The use of the JO in a hard case, therefore, is a tremendous savings of judi-
cial resources.  However, judges also care about reputation, status, prestige,
                                                          
68. Our model has judges optimizing a number of variables—only one of which is the furtherance
of individual policy preferences—subject primarily to workload and rule constraints.  The majority of
the articles in the literature on judicial behavior, however, focus on why judges vote a certain way.
69. In examining the possible incentives to use the JO to solve the caseload problem, we note that
the JO is only one of a series of short cuts at the disposal of the judges, including the use of signed, un-
published opinions and unsigned, unpublished opinions.  Other short cuts include the denial of oral ar-
gument and the extensive use of law clerks and staff attorneys.
70. See Marvell & Moody, supra note 10.
71. For a JO, only certain basic information about the case, such as the names of the parties, must
be entered on a preexisting form.  Cf. COFFIN, supra note 12, at 165 (describing the length of different
forms of dispositions on the First Circuit—one of the circuits that rarely uses the without-comment/JO
disposition).
72. Cf. POSNER, supra note 4, at 9 (ranking securities cases as among the hardest).
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and fulfilling their judicial roles.73  The failure to fulfill the function of the ap-
pellate judge—which is primarily to correct the errors of the lower courts and
contribute to the system of precedent74—by using a JO should hurt reputation,
status and prestige.  Expectations, both internal and external, of “proper” judi-
cial behavior should constrain the judges from relinquishing their traditional
roles.  Using a JO in only a fraction of the hardest cases, however, may not
violate either aspect of the appellate judge’s role.
By statute, parties to suits in federal district court have a right to an ap-
peal.75  Unlike the Supreme Court, the court of appeals does not have the
power to deny review to a properly submitted claim of errors.76  On its face, af-
firmance by a JO appears to be a violation of the right to appeal granted in the
statute.77  In the words of Professors Richman and Reynolds, “the circuit courts
have become certiorari courts.”78  A closer examination, however, reveals that
issuing a JO is not the same as denying certiorari.79
When parties appeal, they do so based on the assertion that the district
court erred, and that the outcome of the case would have been different but for
that error.  No appeal lies on the basis that the reasons the lower court gave
were inadequate, incomplete, or improperly articulated.  The appellant must
assert that the district court’s reasons were incorrect and warrant a reversal.
An appellate panel’s use of a JO (which is almost always an affirmance80) in an
easy case when existing precedent called for a reversal would be tantamount to
                                                          
73. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 12, at 28-29; Cass, supra note 52, at 983.
74. But see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1082 (1994) (“[D]ispensing justice retail by correcting the errors of lower
courts is not the chief business of our appellate courts, much less that of the Supreme Court itself.”).
An extensive literature in political science describes judges as optimizing policy goals subject to the
normative constraint of being expected to follow precedent.  Cf. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The
Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021 (1996) (noting the existence of a norm of con-
sensus decisionmaking on the Marshall court and describing a model of Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing with social and intra-court norms as the primary constraints on judges).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (granting the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction over all appeals from
final decisions of the district courts of the United States); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 275.
76. A right of “appeal” to the Supreme Court exists in an extremely narrow set of cases.  See H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 25
(1991).
77. The certiorari process of the Supreme Court is fundamentally different.  It provides no guaran-
tee that errors will be discernible and fixed.  Errors may be detected, but the Court can, and often
does, choose not to correct them.  See id. at 36, 134.
78. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 275; see also Statement of the Honorable Carolyn Di-
neen King Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Mar.
25, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/dallas/king.htm> (asking the question of whether the
Courts of Appeals are exercising what is essentially discretionary review).
79. The JO is analogous to the Court’s practice of granting review but deciding the case with a
summary order.  See PERRY, supra note 76, at 39, 99.
80. In the Third Circuit, the circuit rule governing use of a JO specifies only affirmances; reversals
require statements of reasons, if not published opinions.  See 3D CIR. R., INTERNAL OPERATING PRO.
5.4, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1998); cf. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 276 (noting that if no
opinion is issued, only a brief “affirmation” is released to the parties).  But cf. PERRY, supra note 76, at
39 (mentioning that the Supreme Court uses the summary disposition in reversals as well as affir-
mances).
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a denial of certiorari because the appellant’s right to have the errors of the dis-
trict court corrected would not have been satisfied.81
On the other hand, it is not clear that the statutory right to error correction
is denied when a JO is used in a hard case.  By definition, these cases have
equally strong prima facie arguments on both sides.82  With finite resources and
when both sides have equally plausible arguments, it is difficult to say that
there is an “error” that must be corrected.  The panel would have to select one
set of strong arguments over the other equally strong arguments to make a
“reasoned” decision,83 but this is not properly called “correcting error.”  When
the appellate court discerns errors, it attempts to correct them.  If a JO is used
in an especially hard case, the litigant is denied a right to have the panel choose
one set of reasons over another and articulate them.  She is denied a reasoned
judicial determination, but she is not denied the right to have trial court
“errors” reversed.
The second part of the appellate role is lawmaking.  This is the primary role
of the Supreme Court, which delegated some lawmaking to the appellate courts
when it could no longer sustain the system’s entire lawmaking burden.84  As a
conceptual matter, therefore, the lawmaking role is not inconsistent with the
power of deciding not to decide.85  From an efficiency point of view, no one
suggests that the parties have a right to ask for an improved or advanced inter-
pretation of the law.  The litigant’s right is to have arguments about the exis-
tence of errors heard and those errors corrected.86  In practice, at least some re-
sources must be devoted to a case for that right to exist.  The parties’ right is to
have a certain minimal level of scrutiny be applied by the appellate court.
Even if the appellate judges who use a JO in difficult cases are satisfying
their error-correction role, are they failing to fulfill their lawmaking role?  Af-
ter all, law most needs to be made in the hardest cases.  The failure to write and
publish an opinion deprives the system of the many positive externalities cre-
ated when a case is decided by a published opinion that gives reasons.87  How-
                                                          
81. Cf. PERRY, supra note 76, at 36, 134 (purpose of certiorari avowedly is not error correction,
although the Court will on occasion grant review to correct egregious errors).
82. “Hard” cases have strong and plausible legal arguments on both sides, thereby requiring
judges to turn to policy preferences to decide the outcome.  See BAUM, supra note 12, at 64; Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
83. Cf. Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (Autumn 1976) (stating that often we have “no commonly accepted measures
for the outputs of alternative policies”).
84. See Dragich, supra note 6, at 768.
85. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J.
62, 70 (1985).
86. See Slavitt, supra note 36, at 112, 118-19.
87. Dragich, supra note 6, at 768-85; cf. Daniel Purcell, Comment, The Public Right to Precedent:
A Theory and Rejection of Vacatur, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 867 (1997) (making similar arguments against
the use of vacatur).
An important line of scholarship criticizes the increased use of ADR and settlement mechanisms,
arguing the nonpublic resolution of disputes deprives society of a valuable public good.  See, e.g., Jules
Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 114-19 (1986); Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion
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ever, this argument assumes that the externalities created by giving and pub-
lishing a statement of reasons are positive, and that the appellate panel will im-
prove the law, or at least not hurt it.  Judges do make errors and do write bad
opinions.  Some opinions confuse doctrine more than they clarify or create it,
particularly by failing to anticipate later cases.88  The risks are especially high in
complex fields that the judges and their clerks know little about.89
Therefore, an appellate panel faced with a complex issue in an area in which
none of the judges is a specialist could plausibly decide that an opinion likely to
cause harm to the law (through errors in the drafting of the opinion) would
outweigh the benefits that would accrue from a public statement of reasons for
the outcome.  Our initial hypothetical represents the complex tax, securities, or
antitrust cases that came before panels of judges with little or no knowledge of
those substantive bodies of law.  The judges and their clerks can learn enough
to resolve the easy and intermediate cases with a high degree of certainty.  The
risk of harm to the system from their writing a lengthy precedent-setting opin-
ion, however, might plausibly be significant enough to avoid an opinion in this
case.90  The district court’s opinion, at least, does not have so much precedential
value.  The system of precedent, therefore, may be better served not by giving a
published statement of published reasons in every hard case, but by avoiding
some of these cases, focusing instead on the somewhat less difficult cases in
which the appellate panel can contribute to the development of the law (for ex-
ample, in contexts where the judges have some ability to foresee the conse-
quences of the precedent they create).91
Avoiding opinions in those difficult cases with a high risk of error not only
benefits the system of precedent,92 but also complements the desire of judges to
                                                          
of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2620-40 (1990).  Strong negative externalities can result from
avoidance of the public, published statement of reasons for the resolution of all disputes in a resource-
constrained system.  For an important theoretical discussion setting forth the social values of informed
consent in mediation, especially autonomy, human dignity, and efficiency, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1999).
88. Cf. Kirk J. Stark, Robert H. Jackson and the Fiscal Practicalities of Tax Adjudication (Jan. 1,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing the problem in the tax context).
89. As Judge Easterbrook has emphasized, judges are overburdened generalists, not specialists.  A
limited amount of time and a complex issue from an unfamiliar area can provide a recipe for disaster.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 780 (1990) (“A
sophisticated judge understands that he is not knowledgeable and so tries to limit the potential damage
[from his decisions].”); cf. Schauer, supra note 53, at 656-58 (describing the dangers of giving reasons
and creating precedent).
90. Diana Gribbon Motz, A Federal Judge’s View of Richard A. Posner’s THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1029, 1038 (1998) (book review), argues instead
that in her view efficiency demands disposal “of at least some such cases [involving non-complex
points of law] by order [and that this] would leave more time for both judges and their staffs to im-
prove the quality of precedent-creating work.”
91. See Schauer, supra note 53, at 656-59.
92. We use the term “hard cases” to describe the set of cases in which the arguments on either
side, precedent- or policy-based, are in equipoise and the court has to exercise its judgment in picking
one set of arguments.  In defining hard cases in this manner, we are excluding the set of cases that are
difficult to decide because they involve the application of well-settled legal standards to unusual facts.
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maintain and enhance their prestige, status, and reputation.  Published opinions
in the most difficult and important cases draw attention from lawyers, academ-
ics, and other courts.  Badly reasoned opinions carry with them the risk of
negative attention (in addition to a risk of reversal and disagreement from
other circuits).93  Judges, therefore, have a reputation-driven incentive to tackle
difficult issues only when they have the time, resources, and expertise to write a
well-reasoned opinion that will withstand external scrutiny and enhance the
author’s reputation.
According to the judicial and societal norms prevailing earlier during this
century, however, part of the judicial function is to provide reasons for a deci-
sion in accordance with the values of the era in which the judge is making a de-
cision.  If judicial discretion and application of principles to fact patterns is
short-circuited, the goal of administrative efficiency may be furthered but spe-
cialist administrative decisionmaking is substituted for the traditional deci-
sionmaking characteristic of generalist common law judges.  In other words, the
cost-benefit analysis of the use of the JO in hard cases failed to take into ac-
count the value in having generalist judges provide reasons in complex cases94—
that is, judicial accountability for decisions made.
E. Affirming Hard Cases Without Reasons: Zucker and Tseng
Disposing of easy cases without stating reasons saves time.  In hard cases,
formulating reasons that can survive public scrutiny and a possible appeal takes
much more time.  In addition, assuming reluctance on the part of the judges to
delegate responsibility for these cases to law clerks or staff attorneys,95 and the
near zero likelihood of a rule violation being detected, there is an incentive to
use a JO in some hard cases.  This section describes two complex securities
cases from the Third Circuit.  The cases raised important, undecided substan-
tive law issues.  Nevertheless, each was affirmed by a JO.96  In each of these
                                                          
For example, the law may be clear on the standard of behavior that merits the death penalty, but de-
ciding whether the conduct at issue meets that standard may be extremely difficult.
93. Some fear that judges will spend a disproportionate portion of their time on difficult and com-
plex cases in areas such as securities law since these are the areas in which one gains accolades (that is,
status and prestige).  See Motz, supra note 90, at 1032-33; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 275-
77; see also Kamar, supra note 63, at 1941 (“There can hardly be a doubt that deciding [large corpo-
rate] cases on a regular basis can be particularly satisfying for judges.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism
and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 146 n.123 (1998) (citing Margaret V. Sachs, Judge
Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV.
777 (1997)).  The complexity of these areas, however, carries with it a high risk of error which, in turn,
can bring a loss in prestige, status, and reputation.  To the extent judges fear losses more than gains
(assuming a symmetry in losses and gains from writing an opinion in such an area), they will avoid
cases in areas such as securities law rather than rush toward them as these commentators expect.
94. Some might argue that the reasons discussed above point toward abolishing the system of gen-
eralist judges and replacing it with one of specialist judges.  For the purposes of this article, we assume
that our federal appellate system will remain largely one of generalist judging.
95. We are merely hypothesizing that one reason why judges might see themselves as forced to
use the JO in some fraction of hard cases may be that their only other option would be to have law
clerks take on the responsibility for these cases.
96. We do not claim to have made a systematic examination of any subset of cases in which the JO
was used.  Our selection of the two cases is fortuitous—they involved issues one of us was researching
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cases, there may have been a legitimate procedural reason for the failure of the
panel to tackle the complex substantive issues, but we do not know and cannot
prove otherwise.  The failure to explain the method of disposition—that is,
giving no reasons for giving no reasons—has created the perception that the
panels may have been doing no more than simply avoiding the difficult issues
raised by the cases.
1.  Zucker v. Quasha.97  On March 31, 1994, Hanover Direct, Inc., a well-
known catalog company, made a public offering of stock,98 three days before
April 2, when the fiscal quarter in progress ended.99  The full-quarter results for
that quarter were worse than expected and disgruntled shareholders who had
purchased stock in the offering sued.100  Their central claim was that Hanover’s
failure to disclose important interim information about the quarter ending only
three days after the offering constituted an actionable omission under Sections
11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.101
The Zucker case came before Judge Bassler of the federal district court in
New Jersey on a motion to dismiss.  The question whether a company issuing a
public offering had any duty to disclose interim information about the quarter
in progress was open.  Two courts, a district court in New Jersey in Renz v.
Schreiber102 and a panel of the Ninth Circuit in In re Worlds of Wonder Securi-
ties Litigation,103 had tackled related issues in cases involving the veracity of
forecasts of full-quarter results made when a quarter was incomplete.  This case
was different in an important way.  The Zucker plaintiffs did not claim that a
misleading forecast was made.  Instead, the claim was that already available in-
formation about the incomplete quarter should have been disclosed.
The issue was important for at least two reasons.  First, the question
whether an issuer is required to disclose intra-quarterly data in an offering
arises in every public offering because every offering is by definition done
sometime during a quarter in progress.  Second, in recent years, the SEC has
adopted rules that make it easier for more established companies such as
Hanover to time their offerings to take advantage of favorable market condi-
tions such as investor sentiment and interest rates.  Besides the importance of
the issue and the paucity of helpful case law or commentary, the question was
difficult.104
                                                          
for a different article on securities law.  The fact that a JO was used in each of two cases raising diffi-
cult substantive law issues, however, led to their inclusion in this article as well.
97. 891 F. Supp. 1010 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d mem., 82 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. See id. at 1012.
99. See id. at 1015.
100. See id. at 1013.
101. See id. at 1018.
102. 832 F. Supp. 766 (D.N.J. 1993).
103. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case
of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 677-79 (1999); see also Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory
Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has It Changed the Law?
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On the one hand, the following factors suggested a holding that the issuer
had no duty to disclose intra-quarterly data in an offering: (1) the SEC explic-
itly required only the disclosure of full-quarter information; (2) the request for
interim information looked suspiciously close to a request that forecasts of full-
quarter information be made and disclosed (and forecasts are not required to
be disclosed under the securities laws); and (3) establishing a duty to disclose
would open the door to more securities litigation, when there is already a wide-
spread perception that much existing securities litigation consists of frivolous
strike suits.105
On the other hand, there were strong arguments in favor of finding a duty
to disclose, including (1) the full-disclosure philosophy that underlies the secu-
rities laws, and (2) the resemblance to insider trading of the issuer’s sale of se-
curities at a price artificially inflated by failing to disclose certain important
negative information about the company.106
Judge Bassler directly confronted the issue.  In what for him was a rare
published opinion,107 he held that the issuer had no duty to disclose information
about a quarter in progress.  The request for this information, he reasoned,
amounted to no more than a request that the company disclose its internal
forecasts.108  This linking of the request for interim data to a request for fore-
casts was important because the disclosure of forecasts, although encouraged, is
not required under the securities laws.109  Although Judge Bassler’s opinion ex-
pressed no doubt about the result it had reached, the opinion did acknowledge
that it was the first to have decided the issue;110 the cases cited in support of his
reasoning addressed issues that were, at best, tangential to the case.111  Fur-
thermore, the fact that Judge Bassler decided to publish his opinion was itself a
signal to the appellate court that the district court judge thought the issue in
this case important.
                                                          
Has It Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 668-69 (1998) (noting the lack of
clarity on the issue).
105. See Gulati, supra note 104, at 677, 716 & n.33.
106. See id. at 678, 719-20.
107. During the two-year period for which we collected data (Aug. 1, 1995, to Aug. 1, 1997), Judge
Bassler published 15 opinions.  Data on district court publication rates is on file with the authors.
108. See Zucker, 891 F. Supp. at 1016.
109. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997);  In re
Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1993).
110. See Zucker, 891 F. Supp. at 1018.
111. In looking to the case law for support for its holding, Judge Bassler’s opinion states:
Even before a quarterly report is formally issued, a corporate official can probably be held li-
able for statements that are false or misleading in light of complete quarterly data that has
become available but has not yet been made public.  Courts have been reluctant, however, to
impose liability based upon a corporate official’s failure to disclose financial data for a fiscal
quarter in progress.
891 F. Supp. at 1015 (internal citations omitted).  The two cases cited in support, Renz v. Schreiber, 832
F. Supp. 766 (D.N.J. 1993) and In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), ad-
dressed claims of nondisclosure that were linked to company forecasts.  In Zucker, however, the claim
was that an independent offering triggered the duty to disclose interim information, not that a forecast
had triggered a duty to disclose interim information.  See Zucker, 891 F. Supp. at 1013.
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Judge Bassler did suggest an alternative basis for granting the motion to
dismiss, even if there were a duty to disclose intra-quarterly information.  He
asserted that the plaintiffs’ claim would have failed in this case because they
had pleaded inadequate facts.112  The facts that Hanover had timed its public of-
fering to occur three days prior to the end of the quarter, had raised a large
quantity of capital in that offering, and had kept back the information for that
quarter which, when disclosed, turned out to be much worse than expected,
were not enough to raise a sufficient inference that the company had the infor-
mation at the time of the offering.  Courts do routinely apply heightened
pleading requirements to securities fraud cases.  Under the fraud pleading
standard of Rule 9(b), Judge Bassler’s argument may have had merit.113  How-
ever, this was not a fraud case.  The plaintiffs instead claimed nondisclosure in
public offering documents, so the standard of liability was strict and the height-
ened pleading standard should not have been applied.  The notice pleading
standard of Rule 12(b)(6), by contrast, should have applied, under which the
plaintiffs’ claims would have survived.114  Judge Bassler’s alternative basis,
therefore, most likely would not have held up on appeal.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing, among other things, that
the district judge had erred in holding that the issuer had no obligation to dis-
close intra-quarterly data.  As far as we can tell, the appellants’ briefs make the
relevant arguments.  Indeed, the quality of the briefs on both sides was far
higher than usual.115  Despite the difficulty and importance of the issue, the dis-
trict court’s language, the fact that the trial court opinion was published, and
the high quality of the briefs, the Third Circuit decided the case without an
opinion—it affirmed with a JO.  The panel declined even to grant oral argu-
ment.  Judge Bassler’s opinion, therefore, was, for the time being, the final
statement on the law in the Third Circuit.
Within weeks of the Third Circuit JO in Zucker, the First Circuit, after
wrestling with the same issue, rendered a decision in Shaw v. Digital Equipment
Corp. and, in a lengthy opinion, arrived at the opposite holding.116  According
to the First Circuit, the issuer had a duty to disclose certain intra-quarterly data
in the offering.117  A few months later, the First Circuit tackled the Zucker issue
again, in Glassman v. Computervision Corp., and issued another lengthy opin-
                                                          
112. See Zucker, 891 F. Supp. at 1016.
113. See, e.g., Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1417 (describing Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard).
114. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223-24 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a
similar claim survives Rule 12(b)(6) easily and even survives Rule 9(b)).
115. Copies of the briefs for the case are on file with the authors.
116. The JO in Zucker was issued on March 26, 1996, and the Shaw opinion was published on May
7, 1996.  See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1194.  In terms of the time it took the two courts to tackle this issue, ar-
guments in Shaw were heard on February 8, 1996, whereas those in Zucker were submitted on March
11, 1996.  The Zucker court beat the Shaw court by two and a half months.  It received the issue ap-
proximately a month after the Shaw court, and decided it approximately a month and a half before the
Shaw panel.
117. Specifically, the duty is to disclose known “extreme departure[s]” from market expectations
for the quarter.  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
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ion.118  Whether the panel of the Third Circuit agreed or disagreed with Judge
Bassler’s opinion, it is hard to imagine that the panel deemed the case easy
enough to warrant a JO.  Why, then, did they use a JO?  Was it to avoid tack-
ling the interim nondisclosure issue?
2.  In re Tseng Labs Securities Litigation.119  Tseng Labs designed and
supplied semiconductor chips that improved the visual quality of computer
monitors.120  In late 1992, Tseng Labs announced a new chip, the W32, that
would improve the performance of the Microsoft Windows operating system.121
The plaintiffs’ case centered around the claim that during the period between
October 29, 1992, and May 21, 1993, the company’s spokespersons made a
number of falsely optimistic statements about the company and its prospects.122
The plaintiff shareholders claimed that these false statements caused them to
purchase stock at artificially inflated prices, which then dropped by
approximately fifteen percent when the company announced on May 21, 1993,
that its second quarter earnings for 1993 would not meet expectations.123
In particular, the claim focused on a March 9, 1993, statement by Tseng’s
vice chairman, John Gibbons.124  He had stated that Tseng Labs “expected to
ship 1.2 million to 1.7 million of the new [W32] chips in the second quarter of
1993.”125  Plaintiffs argued that this statement was doubly false, first, because
Tseng Labs did not have the ability to supply 1.7 million chips, and second, be-
cause Tseng Labs could not possibly have expected to receive orders for that
many chips.126  More important, plaintiffs asserted that even if the statement
was made reasonably and in good faith on March 9 (which would insulate a
forecast from liability),127 the company had known by March 15 that the March
9 forecast was unreasonable.  Therefore, they claimed, even if the March 9
statement was not actionable, the failure to update it on March 15 was.  Plain-
tiffs pointed to an internal forecast on March 15 made by Mark Karsh, a Tseng
Labs officer, that predicted a second-quarter demand for the W32 of 974,850
                                                          
118. 90 F.3d 617 (1st Cir. 1996).  The analysis of the interim disclosure issue by the panels in Shaw
and Glassman was soon thereafter the subject of a note in the Harvard Law Review (one that failed to
notice the district court opinion in Zucker).  See Note, Living in a Material World: Corporate Disclo-
sure of Midquarter Results, 110 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1997); see also Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexo-
rable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations:  “Are We
There Yet?”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 137 & n.6 (1998) (noting the importance of the decision in
Shaw).
119. 954 F. Supp. 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d mem., 107 F.3d 8 (3d Cir. 1997).
120. See 954 F. Supp. at 1025.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1025-26.
124. See id. at 1025.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1030-31.
127. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d Cir. 1997); Glass-
man v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir. 1996).
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units—a far cry from the 1.2 to 1.7 million range publicly forecasted only six
days prior.128
The difficult but important issue in Tseng was the duty to update.129  Two
prior Third Circuit decisions, In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation130
and Greenfield v. Heublein,131 had held that a duty to update existed if a state-
ment, although true when made, became misleading when left unrevised.132
The panels in Phillips Petroleum and Greenfield, however, while stating that
they had no doubt that such a duty existed, had not fleshed out the scope of the
duty because in both cases the duty to update claims had failed for other rea-
sons.133  Specifically, those cases had involved takeovers/mergers, so the opin-
ions did not discuss whether a company had a duty to update an ordinary fore-
cast of sales.134  To make matters complicated, there was a considerable conflict
among the circuits on the issue.  In Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,135 the First Cir-
cuit had expressed ambivalence about the existence of such a duty; the Second
Circuit had suggested in In re Time Warner Securities Litigation136 that such a
duty might exist, but only in extreme circumstances; and in Stransky v. Cum-
mins Engine Co., Inc.,137 the Seventh Circuit had flatly rejected the existence of
such a duty.
The scope of the duty to update is important because it affects the likeli-
hood that corporations will voluntarily disclose forecasts.138  For example, if the
disclosure of an ordinary sales or earnings forecast were to trigger a duty con-
tinuously to update the investing public with all material information that arose
subsequently, a large burden would be attached to the issuance of forecasts and
would likely dissuade companies from disclosing forecasts.139  On the other
hand, a statement of the type such as “merger talks are progressing well” would
remain alive in the minds of investors if not corrected at the point at which
                                                          
128. See Appellant’s Brief at 34-35, In re Tseng Labs Securities Litigation, 107 F.3d 8 (3d Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-1345) (on file with authors).
129. On the significance and difficulty of this issue generally, see William B. Gwyn, Jr. & W. Chris-
topher Matton, The Duty to Update the Forecasts, Predictions, and Projections of Public Companies, 24
SEC. REG. L.J. 366 (1997); Oesterle, supra note 118; Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer’s Duty Under
Rule 10b-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 289 (1991);
Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, The Status of the Duty to Update, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605 (1998).
130. 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
131. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984).
132. See Phillips, 881 F.2d at 1245; Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 758.
133. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 & n.19 (3d Cir. 1997)
(discussing the two cases).
134. See id.
135. 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
136. 9 F.3d 259, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1993).
137. 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th
Cir. 1997).
138. Encouraging companies to make forecasts voluntarily has long been goal of the securities laws.
See, e.g., Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1432; Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir.
1996); Stransky, 51 F.3d 1333.
139. See Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1433.
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merger talks were known to have failed.140  Under these circumstances, the fail-
ure to update the public on the dissolution of the talks might well mislead the
public and cause them to purchase securities based on the false expectation that
a merger was likely to occur.  Once again, as with the issue in Zucker, argu-
ments were strong both in favor of (the principles of full disclosure and fraud
prevention) and against (the fear of opening the door to a flood of frivolous se-
curities lawsuits) creating a duty.
The duty to update, along with the other, more mundane issues in the case,
arrived before Judge Kelly in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on a motion
for summary judgment.141  Finding none of the statements at issue materially
misleading or suffering from material omissions, Judge Kelly granted the mo-
tion.  Even assuming the veracity of the statements issued, however, the ques-
tion remained whether the existence of an internal forecast on March 15 that
differed significantly from the public forecast made on March 9 to Reuters cre-
ated a duty to update the March 9 forecast.142  Unlike Judge Bassler in Zucker,
Judge Kelly in Tseng did not issue a published opinion that directly addressed
the issue.  Instead, the district judge’s unpublished opinion did not discuss the
issue at all, despite language in two Third Circuit opinions, Phillips Petroleum
and Greenfield, that stated that a duty to update did exist.
The plaintiffs appealed.  They claimed, among other things, error in the dis-
trict court’s refusal to recognize a claim based on a duty to update.143  This time
the Third Circuit granted oral argument, and a significant portion of the time at
oral argument was spent on the question of whether there was a duty to update.
Nevertheless, within a few days, the case was affirmed in a JO.  To affirm the
district court’s opinion would require that a duty to update either did not exist
or did not apply.144  Reaching that outcome, however, would have required ei-
ther narrowing considerably the scope of the duty identified in Phillips Petro-
leum and Greenfield, or rejecting the duty identified in those cases altogether.
Existing precedent did not decide the issue, and to the extent that precedent
pointed toward an outcome, it pointed to a reversal, not an affirmance.  Hence,
an affirmance should have required a statement of reasons.
A few months later, a different panel on the Third Circuit, in In re Burling-
ton Securities Litigation, published a lengthy opinion that tackled the duty to
                                                          
140. See id. at 1434.
141. See 954 F. Supp. 1024, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
142. Judge Kelly rejected the claim based on Gibbons’s March 9 statement on the ground that
plaintiffs had not made out a claim that the statement, on the date made, was either unreasonable or in
bad faith.  See id. at 1030-31.  Neither in Judge Kelly’s opinion nor in the Appellee’s briefs is there any
suggestion that the March 9 statement might be immaterial.  Immateriality is not made out, given that
this was a statement about the company’s expectations for its most important product.  Had the state-
ment been immaterial, however, that would most likely have eliminated any duty to update claim.  See
Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 n.33 (1st Cir. 1996).
143. Appellant’s Brief at 34, In re Tseng Labs Securities Litigation, 107 F.3d 8 (3d Cir. 1997) (No.
96-1345) (on file with authors).
144. Of course, as pointed out earlier, in theory the affirmance by JO need not have been based on
the district court’s rationale.  See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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update issue avoided in Tseng.145  A little over a year later, another Third Cir-
cuit panel, this time in Weiner v. Quaker Oats,146 again addressed the duty to
update issue.  Therefore, the issue was both open and worth addressing in
lengthy published opinions.  To the extent the panels in Burlington and Weiner
were better equipped in terms of time and expertise to tackle the issue, the
precedent they created might have been better than what the Tseng panel
would have created.147  The point to observe, however, is that both the Tseng
and Zucker panels chose not to tackle certain issues even though those issues
were both open and squarely before them.148
What do these two cases tell us?  By themselves, two cases over a two-year
period prove little.  But we conceded at the start that we could not prove that
the JO was being systematically used to avoid hard issues.  What we argue is
that, given the incentives and constraints that operate on overburdened circuit
judges, one plausible explanation for reasonless dispositions in cases such as
Zucker and Tseng is that a norm of using the JO to decide hard cases devel-
oped.149  In the sections that follow, we develop this initial theory by looking at
the possible secondary effects of such a norm and at empirical data on publica-
tion practices across the circuits.
F. Tables I-III: Use of the JO
The tables printed in the Appendix to this article detail the use of the JO in
the Third Circuit and across the circuits.  Table I (see page 208) sets forth the
number of cases disposed of without comment by the Third Circuit during the
period between 1989 and 1996.  As the tables show, the Third Circuit consis-
tently used the JO in over half its cases, including sixty percent of the cases
from 1991 to 1996.  Table II (see page 209) contrasts the Third Circuit’s use of
the JO with the use of the without-comment disposition in the other circuits.
To complement this comparison, Table III (see page 210) compares the
caseload burdens across the circuits.
                                                          
145. The Burlington panel substantially narrowed the scope of the duty articulated in Phillips and
Greenfield.  See 114 F.3d 1410, 1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997).  Under the Burlington panel’s narrow articula-
tion of the duty to update, it is likely that Tseng would have been affirmed.
146. 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
147. The Third Circuit does not always shy away from tackling hard securities cases.  Judge
Becker’s opinion in In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir.
1993), which addressed the “bespeaks-caution” doctrine, is one of the more important recent opinions
on securities law.  Similarly, the recent opinions in Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d
Cir. 1994), In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996), Burlington, 114 F.3d 1410, Weiner,
129 F.3d 310, and Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom Mer-
rill Lynch v. Kravitz, 119 S. Ct. 44 (1998), all tackled important and difficult securities law questions.
148. We recognize that it is possible that the reason why the panels in Zucker and Tseng used the
JO instead of published opinions was that the cases had idiosyncratic facts that would have made poor
law.  But existing circuit rules do not permit panels to wait for the right set of facts before tackling an
issue.
149. Cf. Judith Resnick, The Death of Appeals?, 5 FIFTH CIRCUIT REP. 637 (1988) (describing some
appellate judges as claiming that “they can no longer do their work, that they rely inappropriately on
staff, [and] that they concur in cases about which they have not thought enough”).
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The fact that the Third Circuit failed to give any reasons at all for more than
half its dispositions is surprising enough, but the disparity in the use of this
method of disposition across the circuits is more startling.150  While the Third
Circuit led the circuits in the use of this device, the Eighth Circuit used the JO
in approximately one fourth of its cases and the Eleventh in approximately one
fifth of its cases.151  The real disparity, however, is between these three circuits
and the remaining circuits.  The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,152 Sixth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits hardly used the JO at all.
Was there something radically different about the caseload in the Third
Circuit?  After all, the obvious explanation for the disparity in use of the JO is
that the caseload burdens are significantly different.  Perhaps the number of
cases per judge in the Third Circuit was much higher than those in the other
circuits, so the Third Circuit judges were simply overwhelmed.  Looking at the
per-judge caseload in the Third Circuit in isolation, this is a plausible explana-
tion.  For example, Table III shows that in 1993, the number of cases per judge
was 132.4 in the Third Circuit.  Assuming no holidays, that works out to decid-
ing a case approximately once every 2.75 days; and that would include reading
the briefs, checking the record, listening to oral argument, analyzing the argu-
ments, reading the relevant precedent, and discussing the issues with law clerks
and the other judges on the panel.153  That leaves little time for writing a set of
reasons for a decision, let alone a precedent-creating set of reasons.  Arguably
the caseload provides some explanation for why the Third Circuit chose to pro-
vide reasons in so few of its dispositions (and published reasons in even fewer).
The caseload explanation partially fails, however, because the per-judge
caseload burden is even higher in a number of the other circuits—in fact in
eight of the other twelve circuits.154  The majority of these other circuits do not
use the JO often, but do provide reasons in almost all dispositions.  Table III
also shows that the caseload of the Third Circuit, adjusted for difficulty of
                                                          
150. The use of staff attorneys in the Third Circuit and the First Circuit (which rarely uses the JO)
is illustrative.  In the First Circuit, highly qualified staff attorneys, almost all with extensive practice
experience and some with prior service as law clerks, screen cases and draft opinions in pro se and ha-
beas corpus cases.  Judges supervise the work of these highly capable staff attorneys, but scrutiny is
minimal.  Cf. Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 32-
33 (1990) (describing the First Circuit’s extensive use of staff attorneys nearly a decade ago); King, su-
pra note 78 (describing the Fifth Circuit’s extensive use of experienced and skilled staff attorneys);
Hatchett, supra note 6 (describing the same on the Eleventh Circuit).  On the Third Circuit, in con-
trast, the judges let the staff do very little.  Staff tend to be young, and competition for these positions
is not keen, as it is for clerkships with individual judges.
151. It is interesting to note that, in 1996, three of the six circuits that did not ask Congress for new
judgeships were the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh, the three circuits that used the JO in a significant
fraction of their cases.  See POSNER, supra note 4, at 232-33 & tbl.7.6, 235.
152. See Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can
Judges Select Cases of “No Precedential Value?”, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980).
153. This rough calculation does not include the time judges spend deciding motions, working on
committees, taking or giving seminars, and a number of other job-related tasks.
154. Given its unique caseload, we do not use numbers from the Federal Circuit.  See STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 3, at 72 (describing the specialized nature of the Federal Circuit).
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cases, is not dramatically different from the other circuits.155  For example, the
Third Circuit’s caseload is approximately the same as that in the First, Fourth,
and Seventh Circuits, three circuits that provide reasons in nearly one hundred
percent of their dispositions.  What explains this disparity?  How are judges on
other circuits able to provide reasons for so many more of their dispositions
that judges on the Third Circuit?  As the tables discussed in Part V show,
judges on the First and Seventh Circuits, publish more than twice the number
of opinions that judges on the Third Circuit do.
The question remains about how the judges on the other circuits provide
reasons, often in lengthy published opinions, in so many more of their cases.
Where do they get the extra time?  The judges in these other circuits must be
delegating substantial portions of their work.  Someone other than the judge is
likely providing the written reasons in a large number of cases.  Another possi-
bility is that the supposedly “reasoned” short-form dispositions in other circuits
are the functional equivalent of the “without comment” dispositions in the
Third Circuit.  The disparity in behavior between the Third Circuit and the oth-
ers in terms of the use of the JO is interesting in and of itself, but similar dis-
parities in the reason-giving mechanisms across the circuits are worth noting as
well.
IV
SECONDARY EFFECTS OF NOT MAKING LAW: CAUSE FOR PAUSE
The use of a JO in the especially hard cases is problematic because it flies in
the face of the model of the great appellate judges—Cardozo, Learned Hand,
Friendly—who tackled difficult issues head on and advanced the law through
opinions.156  Has the siren call of the JO enthralled judicial norms in the name
of docket control?  Have judges failed to internalize the costs of not giving rea-
sons to both the litigants and the system of precedent in order to place their de-
sire to process cases above the interests of the public?  This simplistic analysis,
however, does not mesh with the observation that the judges using the JO ap-
pear to be working as hard as their colleagues on other circuits and appear to
place great importance on fulfilling the error-correction and precedent-creation
aspects of their roles.
These observations force us to think more carefully about the value of
spending a large fraction of a finite set of resources on a few cases without a
clear “right” outcome, thereby depriving easier cases that did have “right” out-
comes of the resources they need.  Judges have a finite amount of time that
must be divided among a large set of cases.  Therefore, if T is the total amount
                                                          
155. Discussing the attempt in POSNER, supra note 4, at 75, 230, to calculate the difficulty of differ-
ent caseloads, Motz, supra note 90, at 1031-32, cautions against relying heavily on data to indicate
meaningful conclusions or “quantify . . . [the] unquantifiable.”
156. A number of commentators have castigated failures to give reasons for decisions on the
ground that “reasoned elaboration” is both the “norm and ideal” of appellate decisionmaking and that
departure from tradition is bad.  See Schauer, supra note 53, at 633.
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of time and an opinion in case A takes x units of time, there are necessarily
only T – x units of time left for the remaining cases.  Whether case A deserves x
units is not only a function of the benefits of using x units on that case, but also
of the cost of not having some or all of those x units available for the other
cases.  Efficiency requires allocating scarce resources between competing cases.
The negative impact of the secondary effects of using the JO cannot be eas-
ily dismissed.157  In a system constrained by overwhelming caseloads, the use of
a JO in some fraction of hard cases may arguably be preferable to having law
clerks or staff attorneys decide and write opinions in those cases.158  The focus
shifts from the effects of a JO on an individual case to the effects of using the
JO on the system.  In particular, there are two effects: the development of law
within a circuit that uses a JO in a fraction of its hard cases and the implications
of differences across the circuits in the use of this method of case disposition.
The secondary systematic effects are not necessarily negative, but they are
worth noting.  These effects include the following: first, increasing delegation of
the lawmaking role to the district courts; second, exacerbating the existing dif-
ferences in power and influence among judges within a circuit; third, increasing
disparities across subject areas, leading to disproportionate use of the JO in
some areas; fourth, exacerbating disparities in power and influence among cir-
cuit courts; fifth, increasing room for strategic judicial behavior; and sixth,
jeopardizing the core values of accountability, legitimacy, stability, and predict-
ability.
A. Delegation of Lawmaking Role to the District Courts
An appellate court’s decision to affirm a hard case without opinion shifts
the primary lawmaking responsibility to the district court.159  The district court’s
articulation of the law governs the case.  If the district court publishes its opin-
ion, that opinion stands as the most recent and authoritative pronouncement on
the issue.  An appellate affirmance without comment signifies neither approval
nor disapproval of the district court’s rationale.  Anyone later examining the
issue—an individual deciding how to act or a court deciding how to rule on a
similar issue—will be guided only by the district court’s opinion.160  In addition,
because the circuit court has punted, when the same issue arises in another dis-
                                                          
157. That informal social mechanisms are both the primary and most effective means of controlling
judicial behavior may explain why many judges rationally resist expanding the judiciary on the grounds
that such an expansion would hurt “prestige” and “collegiality,” both important elements of a norm-
based enforcement system.  But see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 301-02, 323-25 (criticizing
the premise that an expansion would hurt prestige and collegiality).
158. Judges may turn to law clerks and staff even in the Third Circuit, which used the JO exten-
sively.  See supra text accompanying note 15.  If the judges enjoy their work and do not like delegating
work to clerks and staff attorneys, however, the availability of the JO enables them to avoid delega-
tion.
159. The increased delegation of the lawmaking function has been discussed elsewhere, albeit in a
different context.  See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631.
160. See Dragich, supra note 6, at 787 & n.21.
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trict court in that circuit, that court will not be bound by the prior determina-
tion; the latter district court may interpret the law anew.  As the appellate court
performs its lawmaking function in a smaller and smaller number of cases, the
judicial lawmaking role increasingly shifts to the district courts.
District judges, however, tend to be specialists in trial management, not in
opinion writing or lawmaking.  Moreover, they sit alone and do not have the
benefit of the intellectual debate among a panel.161  Therefore, the quality of
lawmaking may decrease.162  Furthermore, the law will be applied even less uni-
formly.  On the other hand, a district court’s opinion has little precedential ef-
fect, so the potential harm is minimal compared to a badly reasoned appellate
opinion.  Plus, when an appellate panel eventually decides to address the issue,
it will have multiple district court opinions on the question to consider.163
B. Intra-Circuit Differences in Power and Influence
Differences in power and influence among individual judges on a circuit al-
ways exist.  Individual judges can and do dominate the courts they sit on
through personality, political savvy, the ability to build consensus, and, on occa-
sion, sheer intellectual ability.  Examples abound: Holmes, Cardozo, Brennan,
Learned Hand, Friendly, and Posner.164  The availability of the JO option
makes it more likely that such differences in power and influence will emerge.
Judges care about reputation, error correction, precedent creation, and the
availability of minimal amounts of leisure.  Judges will, however, differ in the
values they attach to these goals.165  Some judges obtain great satisfaction from
seeing their opinions cited in casebooks and law review articles, while others
may derive more satisfaction from compliments from members of the local bar.
Still others value fairness to the litigants above publishing opinions or counting
citations.  Similarly, judges differ in their interests in particular areas of the law:
Some enjoy complex tax and bankruptcy cases, while others abhor them.166  Is-
suing a JO in a hard case creates the possibility that these differences in goals
will exacerbate existing distortions in power and influence among the judges.167
                                                          
161. Cf. David Charny, The Economic Analysis of Deliberative Procedures (Apr. 15, 1997)
(unpublished paper presented at the Harvard Law & Economics workshop, on file with authors)
(discussing the efficiency enhancing aspects of deliberative processes).
162. See Bussel, supra note 74, at 1086-87.
163. In some cases, it may be more important to decide an issue quickly than to decide it correctly,
that is, the benefits accruing from certainty may outweigh the costs of a sub-optimal rule.  But unless
one can make the empirical statement that for all cases the costs of delayed lawmaking outweigh the
benefits that accrue from increased certainty, it may be best to allow the appellate courts to decide
when lawmaking is called for and when it should be delayed.
164. In contrast, the influence of others such as Justices Frankfurter and Douglas was far less than
what might have been expected given their intellectual abilities.  See BAUM, supra note 12, at 1.
165. See id. at 30-31 (citing studies on judges).
166. Cf. id. at 111 (noting that Earl Warren overassigned himself civil rights cases, but not eco-
nomics cases).
167. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV.
321, 337-39 (1997) (documenting wide differences in influence across judges in the adjudication of ha-
beas corpus applications—an extremely low visibility process).
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Judges concerned about creating precedent or furthering their normative
vision of the law will use the JO in very few hard cases.  They will write and
publish opinions in as many hard cases as possible—perhaps even using their
law clerks to produce more opinions.  Judges who care less about creating
precedent and being cited and more about error correction and creating good
law, on the other hand, will use the JO more frequently.  They will avoid writ-
ing opinions in cases in which the risks of error are high, preferring instead to
focus on the cases in which they can be confident they are correcting errors and
creating good law.  To the extent judges dislike using law clerks in the deci-
sionmaking process, they will be even more likely to use the JO.  These differ-
ences in style allow the first category of judge to create a great deal more
precedent than the second category.  This difference in lawmaking influence is
further exacerbated if the first set of judges writes its opinions in broad rather
than narrow language.
Analogous differences also can arise in subject areas, as discussed in the
next subsection.  If there are areas of the law that most judges find difficult and
uninteresting, then judges will use the JO in these areas the most, avoiding the
hard cases in those areas.  This, in turn, has the effect of ceding the area to the
few judges who find the area interesting or want to increase their influence
generally.  Certain judges, therefore, will be able to capture precedent in par-
ticular areas.
The creation of differences in power and influence are not necessarily nega-
tive.  Judges who care about being cited and about what academics think of
their opinions have an incentive to write better opinions.  Similarly, judges who
enjoy bankruptcy issues likely write better bankruptcy opinions because they
better understand the field.  For example, Justice Powell, a former corporate
lawyer, wrote most of the important Supreme Court securities law opinions
during his tenure, and commentators have not perceived that as unduly prob-
lematic.168  On the other hand, academics may have simply ignored the prob-
lems of judicial capture and specialization.
C. Differences in Power and Influence Across Subject Areas
Individual judges differ in their preferences for cases in different subject ar-
eas.  In the aggregate, the judges on a circuit will all most likely share a distaste
for at least some unduly complex or simply boring subjects.  The option of us-
ing a JO in hard cases creates a risk that the hard cases in these disfavored
subject areas will be completely ignored.  These areas of interest or disinterest
will depend on the composition of the circuit court.  If the court consists mostly
of former corporate lawyers, it is likely they will consider working on corporate
                                                          
168. See Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Se-
curities Fraud and Property Rights, SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (noting the difference in how the
Supreme Court decided complex securities cases when Justice Powell was on the Court and when he
was not); see also Sachs, supra note 93, at 809-15 (describing how Judge Friendly during his tenure on
the Second Circuit wrote a disproportionate number of the securities opinions).
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tax and securities cases rewarding and enjoyable.  On the other hand, in a cir-
cuit of mainly former generalists in commercial law, the judges are likely to pay
less attention to tax or securities; these judges will be more likely to choose a
hard employment discrimination case than a hard corporate tax case.
Even with the increasingly diverse gender and racial backgrounds of federal
appellate judges, they are still likely to be middle- and upper-class, relating
more easily to certain kinds of disputes than others.  Judges are generally un-
likely to find veterans’ benefits or prisoners’ rights cases interesting.169  By con-
trast, employment discrimination and affirmative action are interesting subjects
because judges probably have encountered and thought about these problems
no matter their political persuasion.  To the extent that the judges share a dis-
taste for a particular area, the availability of the JO can mean that the hard
cases in these areas will receive less attention and the case law will be underde-
veloped.
The differences in judicial power and influence that the JO can potentially
cause, however, are not necessarily worse than those resulting from the oppo-
site situation.  The availability of the JO distorts the development of the law
toward areas that judges enjoy.  To the extent judges have a distaste for the
more complex areas—antitrust, securities, tax—the hard cases in these areas
will receive less attention.  Circuits that address all the hard cases with pub-
lished opinions, but dispose of the less difficult cases with unpublished opin-
ions, will invest resources toward the more complex cases, increasing the influ-
ence of those circuits on these issues.  Both systems have inherent power
differences.
In the circuits relying on the JO or other short-form dispositions for hard
cases, the judges themselves determine the power differences.  The judges cor-
rect errors in all cases and write published opinions in most cases in which
precedent points to an answer the district court has missed.  The judges also
pick and choose the hard cases in which to develop precedent.  In the non-JO
system, on the other hand, the litigants determine the differences:170  Litigants
who present the best-briefed, complex cases will obtain precedent-creating
opinions, because the non-JO system produces published opinions in hard cases
(and easy cases get published opinions only if resources are left over).  As Pro-
fessor Marc Galanter famously pointed out, it is the “haves” in society who are
likely to benefit from a litigant-dominated system of precedent creation.171
Therefore, when hard cases receive published opinions but marginal cases are
decided with short or no opinions, the hard cases (often in antitrust, securities,
                                                          
169. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 281.
170. This is an overstatement.  There are no doubt judge-caused differences even in circuits that do
not use the JO.  Judges can, and probably do, avoid writing opinions in hard cases by using devices
other than the JO.  Cf. generally Macey, supra note 32 (describing how judges, on occasion, use discre-
tion-based procedural devices to avoid tackling substantive issues).  Our point is that the JO makes it
easy to avoid a distasteful case.
171. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103 (1974).
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insurance, and tax) will take up a disproportionate share of judicial resources.172
The point, however, is not that the power differences in one system are prefer-
able to the other, but that such differences develop in a more pronounced
fashion when the JO is used in hard cases.
D. Inter-Circuit Differences in Power and Influence
Just as individual judges differ in the importance they attach to the law-
making role, so do entire circuits.  Circuits are small groups—even the largest,
the Ninth Circuit, has fewer than thirty members—and the aggregate of the
preferences of group members will not necessarily converge.  If norms are not
determined by a simple aggregation of group preferences but are instead dis-
proportionately influenced by factors such as the preferences of a strong leader,
the norms will diverge across the circuits because the preferences of leaders are
likely to differ across circuits.  The tables discussed in Parts III and V demon-
strate that publication norms have developed differently across the circuits.
We hypothesize that it is acceptable practice to use the JO in hard cases in
some circuits and unacceptable to do so in others; these differential norms can
cause differences in power and influence among the circuits as well as among
the individual judges on a circuit.
In a circuit that uses the JO in hard cases, judges will not only publish fewer
opinions, but also will focus publication resources on areas of the law that they
either find interesting or feel a social obligation to address.173  In a circuit that
does not use the JO in hard cases, by contrast, not only will judges publish more
opinions, but cases in more complex areas will receive greater attention.  A cir-
cuit not using the JO publishes two or three times the number of opinions that
a circuit using the JO does, and publishes many more opinions in hard cases,
even if some are of lower quality.  Similarly, while antidiscrimination law (an
area that most judges find interesting and socially relevant) may be highly de-
veloped in circuits using the JO, tax and bankruptcy law (areas for which judges
do not have great enthusiasm) may be more developed in the circuits not using
the JO.
Differences in power, therefore, can develop across the circuits both in the
number of precedents created and in the areas of law developed.  The differ-
ences in power and influence that develop across the circuits—differences in-
dependent of the circuit’s size or caseload—will, in turn, add to the importance
of which circuit a new judge is joining.  As the data described in Part V demon-
                                                          
172. Professor David Wilkins pointed out to us that it is not that the “haves” necessarily bring the
hardest cases, but rather that they have the resources (highly skilled lawyers) to make it appear that
their issues are the most complex (and therefore the most worthy, or unworthy, of judicial attention).
173. It is interesting to note that as the fraction of cases disposed with a JO in the Third Circuit
dropped from 62.3% in 1996 to 52.9% in 1997 and 32.8% in 1998, the fraction of cases in which pub-
lished opinions were written rose from 13.7% in 1996 to 17.1% in 1997 and 24.6% in 1998.  See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 20, at tbl. S-3.  The circuit also
went from using the unsigned, unpublished opinion in no more than a handful of its cases (0.3% in
1996) to using it in more than 10% of its cases (11.2% in 1998).  See id.  Analogously, the numbers on
signed, unpublished opinions went from 23.8% in 1996 to 41.4% in 1998.  See id.
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strate, if the judge is appointed to a circuit with a norm of generating as much
law as possible, the judge will have a greater influence in developing precedent
than if he or she were appointed to a circuit with a norm of permitting the JO in
hard cases.
E. Strategic Behavior
The availability of the JO in hard cases increases the likelihood of strategic
behavior by judges when deciding a case.174  In the circuits not using the JO in
hard cases, the judges on an appellate panel have two options for a case raising
a difficult issue.175  They can either affirm with a published opinion or reverse
with a published opinion.  In a circuit using the JO, a third option is available:
affirm without writing an opinion.  This third option can alter the outcome of a
case because the judges may choose the simpler affirmance choice when they
otherwise would have voted for a reversal if an opinion had been required.176
This increased room for strategic behavior is best illustrated with an exam-
ple.  Consider a three-judge panel faced with a difficult single-issue case, such
as our initial securities law hypothetical.  The judges neither enjoy securities
law issues nor care much whether the investor or the issuing company wins the
case.  At oral argument, the judges unsuccessfully urge both sides to settle.  At
the post-argument conference, two of the three judges are weakly inclined to
reverse the district court’s resolution of the disclosure-update issue.  The third
judge, however, has a strong preference for affirmance and states that he is
prepared to dissent should his two colleagues decide to write and publish a re-
versal.  Assuming sincere voting, the two judges in favor of a reversal draft a
majority and the third drafts a dissent from an opinion to reverse the district
court.
The use of the JO in hard cases can alter this outcome.  In this hypothetical,
while the two judges in favor of a reversal have a weak preference for reversal,
the dissenter, in contrast, has a strong preference for affirmance.  Judges, for
the most part, do not like writing in the face of a dissent, especially if they are
                                                          
174. We define sincere or nonstrategic behavior as voting consistently with one’s outcome prefer-
ence for that case, without considering the impact of the vote on the collective result for that case.  See
BAUM, supra note 12, at 90.  Outcome preference, in turn, is the outcome that one thinks is most ap-
propriate for the case based on normal considerations of precedent and policy arguments.  What we
describe as an outcome preference has been described by others as judgment-based decisionmaking.
See Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53, 53-54 (1977);
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1343 n.113 (1995).
175. We use a single-issue case to remove the complication of judges voting differently on different
issues.  In theory, one could multiply the options by positing different ways of drafting the opinion, but
the options still fall into the categories of either writing to affirm or writing to reverse.  Others have
noted, however, that the norm among judges is to vote on outcomes in cases and not on individual is-
sues.  See BAUM, supra note 12, at 71.  For a study of judicial tailoring of historical arguments to out-
comes, see C.M.A. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complemen-
tary or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 332 (1988).
176. See Caminker, supra note 1 (asking whether it is ever normatively acceptable for justices to act
strategically to alter a case outcome and thereby produce a better precedent).
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unsure about and lack an interest in the area.177  The presence of a vigorous dis-
sent forces the author of the majority to expend greater effort on his opinion.
The additional attention that a dissent attracts increases both the risk of criti-
cism and an en banc or Supreme Court reversal.  To the extent the third judge
is well respected and has a reputation for writing strong dissents, the other two
judges are even worse off.
Because in our hypothetical the two judges in favor of a reversal have only a
weak preference to reverse, but a strong aversion to writing a reversal accom-
panied by a dissent, the JO alternative becomes more attractive.  The JO cre-
ates no precedent, and the two judges do not care much which party wins.  To
the extent they care about creating precedent, it is easier to wait until they are
on a panel with a third judge who shares their views.  The third judge also has
an incentive to agree to the JO because although he would have preferred an
affirmance with an opinion, the JO produces an affirmance and saves the effort
of dissenting.  Furthermore, use of a JO leaves open the possibility that at some
later date the third judge may be on a panel with judges who share his views.
The result, therefore, is that all three judges can agree to dispose of the case
with a JO.  The availability of the JO induces the two judges with a preference
for a reversal to alter their votes strategically to forestall a dissent.
Strategic behavior can also occur without the JO alternative.  Assuming two
judges with a weak preference for reversal and a strong dissenter, fear of a dis-
sent may be strong enough to cause the two less committed judges to capitulate
and agree to affirm with an opinion by the third.  The availability of the JO,
however, makes capitulation significantly easier because no precedent is cre-
ated.  Thus, the JO option, in addition to making strategic behavior more likely,
also makes it easier for strong individual judges to exert their will on their less-
committed colleagues.
F. Accountability, Legitimacy, Stability, and Predictability
The requirement of providing reasons for the outcome renders a decision-
maker externally accountable.178  In turn, external accountability provides le-
gitimacy, stability, and predictability to the lawmaking process:  External ob-
servers can examine the judges’ fidelity to the substantive law.179  Public
revelation of reasoning also clarifies whether the decisionmakers have relied on
illegitimate criteria—for example, preferences based on race, class, or gender.
                                                          
177. See generally Posner, supra note 29, at 15 (noting that dissents raise arguments that require
response).  Posner describes the phenomenon we discuss in this section as “going-along” voting to ob-
tain leisure, as including “aversion to any sort of ‘hassle.’”  Id. at 20.
178. See King, supra note 78 (“[G]iving reasons, however briefly, provides a basis for accountability
of the panel and the system generally.”).
179. Judge Wood, in a recent speech, made the point that external observability, and hence, ac-
countability, is reduced when judging becomes more specialized and opinions become complex and
difficult for an external observer to understand.  See Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized
World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767 (1997).  On specialized adjudication more generally, see Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377.
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While these functions of the judicial system enhance social welfare, they are of-
ten couched in terms of values other than efficiency.
Public accountability for a decision ensures that the judges remain faithful
to precedent and use legitimate criteria in their decisions.  The common law has
“for some long time been equated with the words and deeds of courts.”180
Making a decision that either visibly deviates from the dictates of precedent or
is based on illegitimate criteria is likely to result in both reversal and a loss of
reputation.  This gives judges an incentive to follow the dictates of precedent,
which in turn ensures stability, predictability, and, of course, legitimacy—all
values integral to ensuring the rule of law.181  The American practice of having
an individual judge write the court’s opinion increases the level of accountabil-
ity by placing the individual author’s, and not just the court’s, reputation on the
line.182  Therefore, the failure to provide reasons undermines the foundations of
our precedent-based system, which assumes that judges follow precedent by a
process of reasoning and deliberation.183  Furthermore, even if judges who do
not provide reasons are following precedent, their failure to provide reasons
creates a risk that the system will be perceived as illegitimate.184
Professor Fallon describes the “legal process ideal type” of the rule of law
as one valid interpretation of the rule of law.  The characteristics of this process
of interpretation include a connection between reasonableness and law, legal
analysis and procedural fairness in applying laws and making decisions, and ju-
dicial review and reasoned deliberation in governmental agencies and branches
                                                          
180. J.H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 169
(1986).
181. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1997); see also Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in
THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)
(discussing different purposes served by the rule of law).  Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal
Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 18-21 (William Twining ed., 1986), deals with the
maxims or principles of the common law as a customary system to provide guidance for future conduct.
182. Per curiam opinions in difficult cases are sometimes described as signs of a court’s strength and
solidarity (for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), but they could as easily
indicate instances in which no single judge is willing to put his or her reputation at stake on the opin-
ion.
183. “The entire appellate process is traditionally thought of as ending in a conjunction of three
events—an oral argument, a set of briefs, and a judicial opinion.”  Frank M. Coffin, Research for Effi-
ciency and Quality: Review of MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1857,
1862 (1990) (book review).  Cass, supra note 52, at 992, states: “Indeed, the common law’s traditional
emphasis on case-by-case development of legal doctrine accords primacy to the result.  This preference
for incrementalism reflects the view that rationales become less trustworthy guides to future decisions
the more they extrapolate from the base of known fact-settings to which they apply.”  MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 147-48 (1994), argues that the
[d]iscipline of writing out the reasons for a decision and responding to the main arguments of
the losing side has proved to be one of the most effective curbs on arbitrary judicial power
ever devised. . . .  Those important safeguards are lost when, as is increasingly the case, deci-
sions are rendered without written opinions and judicial panels vote after little or no discus-
sion.
184. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 239
(Summer 1998) (“At a fundamental level, much of civil justice—particularly in the common law envi-
ronment—depends on the parties’ perception of the judge . . . .”).
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to guarantee justice and fairness.185  Previously, at least, consent and consensus
validated proper legal decisionmaking, although our current society’s explicitly
acknowledged pluralism makes consensus incapable of becoming universal.186
Professor Fallon sums up this interpretation of the rule of law as the controver-
sial purpose of setting forth “a plausibly attainable ideal for modern legal sys-
tems that include pervasive administrative bureaucracies and rely heavily on
courts to adapt legal norms to rapidly changing conditions.”187
The argument for mandating that reasons be given in cases—especially the
hard cases in which the reasons are not readily visible—is strong.  Accountabil-
ity is crucial to ensure fidelity to rules or norms of legitimate decisionmaking.
Judges on the federal circuit courts, however, are not constrained solely by ex-
ternal accountability.  Indeed, we argue that internal accountability is ex-
tremely important as well.  Judges are constrained because they make their de-
cisions in panels and not as individuals.  Cross-judge mutual monitoring and the
risk of reversal by an en banc court should ensure that judges do not use the JO
to subvert the commands of precedent.188
The real fear is that the use of the JO in case disposition will cause the pub-
lic to perceive the system as unfair, arbitrary, and illegitimate.  Avoiding this
problem depends on the types of cases in which the JO is used.  In discussing
judicial incentives to use the JO, we described two categories of likely cases:
the easy cases and difficult cases.  Easy cases do not merely suggest, but actu-
ally require, a specific outcome; the difficult cases have strong arguments on ei-
ther side, both precedent and policy based.  Does the danger of the public per-
ceiving the system as unfair, arbitrary, and illegitimate appear in both types of
cases?  Take the easy cases first.  In these cases, the existing body of law points
to a clear outcome, so it will, by definition, be obvious if the court fails to fol-
low the dictates of the law.  The JO outcome, therefore, will follow the dictates
of law.
But what about the hard cases in which the arguments on either side are in
equipoise?  Is the decision to choose one side over the other without giving rea-
sons (or even having reasons) unfair, arbitrary, and illegitimate?  What about
the rule of law values of stability and predictability?  Two sets of prima facie
strong arguments are in competition.  In making a reasoned decision, the
judges would be picking one set of reasons over the other.  If the judges see the
                                                          
185. Professor Fallon cites, among others, the classic authorities for the basic position, HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 4-5, 145-53, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994);
Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988), and Justification (and Justifiability) of
Law in a Contradictory World, in NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71, 83-85 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1986).  See Fallon, supra note 181, at 18-19 nn.77-79, 81, 83-85, 93.
186. See HART & SACKS, supra note 185, at li, cxvii-cxix (pointing out that society has far less con-
sensus than was previously assumed).
187. Fallon, supra note 181, at 37.
188. Cf. Baker, supra note 6, at 927; Dragich, supra note 6, at 786 (imagining ways judges might
abuse the JO).  No one suggests that the judges are using the JO to avoid having to follow precedent or
to show favoritism to one side, but rather only to reduce their work load.
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reasons on either side as equally strong, their decision to pick one set of reasons
over the other is, from an efficiency point of view, arguably no more unfair, ar-
bitrary, or illegitimate than their decision to affirm in all such cases, as they
would do with a JO.  In fact, the decision to affirm is, again from an efficiency
point of view, arguably fairer and less arbitrary because it defers to the out-
come—although not the reasoning—of the prior decisionmaker, the district
court.  The efficient rule, in other words, is that, other considerations being
equal, the winner in the district court wins on appeal.  In a two-stage evaluation
process which fails to produce a clear result in the second round, the optimal
outcome is to reward the first round winner.189  This process is different from
saying, as the non-JO system sometimes appears to operate, “other things being
equal, the winner has won the appellate court popularity contest.”  Such a
process would in fact be random, arbitrary, and perceived as illegitimate.190  For
stability and predictability values, these hard cases are by definition ones in
which the substantive law does not predict an outcome.
Accountability is not satisfied, however, by administrative efficiency alone,
and the efficiency analysis only lists in sic-et-non fashion the competing argu-
ments on each side.  On the other hand, a value more central to law, namely
that generalist judges apply their practical reasoning power to reach a princi-
pled decision in all cases, does offer more than the merely administratively effi-
cient choice when deciding cases.
The analysis of secondary effects, especially with respect to core process
values such as accountability and legitimacy, sheds doubt on the efficiency-
driven calculation that the use of the JO in some fraction of hard cases might
be positive.  Judges who care deeply about these secondary effects would most
likely resist any efficiency-driven movement toward the development of a norm
of using the JO in some fraction of hard cases.  But the empirical data on publi-
cation practices does little to answer our question about what the true norms
are.  Instead, the stark disparities in publication practices across the circuits
suggest that different norms have developed in different circuits.  Within the
context of those differences, it is plausible that some circuits have norms de-
rived primarily from efficiency concerns, whereas others operate under norms
that are derived more from process concerns.
V
PRELIMINARY DATA: CROSS-CIRCUIT PUBLICATION PRACTICES
Tables IV through XI in the Appendix (see pages 211-23) present data on
cross-circuit publication practices.  The results suggest not only that internal
                                                          
189. But cf. Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
297, 333-44 (1982) (discussing the role of courts not in terms of economic efficiency but in legal terms,
that is, providing guidelines for future decisions and assuring litigants that like cases are treated alike).
190. The use of random processes to resolve disputes is not entirely unknown.  See BOSMAJIAN,
supra note 67, at 20-21 (describing examples of societies in which disputes are resolved by chance).
Indeed, in some contexts, a lottery-based system might be perceived as more legitimate than one that
relies on the exercise of reasoned judgment by designated individuals.
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norms in some circuits have deviated from the behavior mandated in the circuit
rules, but that internal norms have evolved differently across the circuits.  The
focus is the development of one particular norm, the use of the JO in hard
cases.  Our data is preliminary because our results no more than scratch the
surface of the issues we have raised:  Extreme disparities in lawmaking behav-
ior across the circuits do exist.  There are, however, no easy explanations for
these disparities.  They can be explained partially by cross-circuit differences in
caseloads, differential evolution of social norms across the circuits, and path
dependence, but these explanations are only hypotheses.  The disparities are
real and are worth studying in greater detail.
A. Tables IV-XI: Variations Within and Across the Circuits
Individual judges on a circuit that uses the JO will differ in their publication
preferences.  Some judges, who likely derive satisfaction from having their
opinions cited, will want to publish as many opinions as possible, and others,
who dislike criticism, will avoid scrutiny and hence, publication.  Assuming,
therefore, that the judges in the circuit differ in their preferences for publishing,
lifting the requirement that all hard cases require published opinions will result
in the publication-seeking judges publishing more—that is, using the JO in
fewer hard cases—and the publication-shy judges publishing fewer opinions.
Analogously, the availability of the JO also allows for differences among
the judges on a circuit in the use of law clerks.  Assume that the extensive use
of law clerks in drafting opinions is the prevalent norm in a circuit.191  The addi-
tional norm of avoiding an opinion in certain hard cases permits a judge who
does not like using law clerks to draft opinions not to use them in such cases.
Selecting which cases will receive opinions saves that judge enough time to en-
able that judge to draft all the opinions himself.  Differences within the circuit
can emerge between judges willing to use law clerks extensively in the drafting
and reasoning process and those who treat their clerks exclusively as research
assistants.  Other factors being equal, the first group is likely to generate more
case law than the latter group, thereby creating a difference in power and influ-
ence that might not exist if the judge with a distaste for the use of law clerks
had been forced by the pressures of her caseload to use her clerks to draft
opinions.
We hypothesized, in the context of their extensive use of the JO, that judges
on the Third Circuit may have felt unconstrained to decline to publish opinions
in some hard cases.  The data on publication practices, however, suggest that
                                                          
191. Indeed, use of clerks in drafting opinions appears to be the dominant norm across the circuits.
See Motz, supra note 90, at 1034;Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 275.  Judges, however, differ
both in their views about the appropriate role of law clerks and in how they use their clerks.  Judges
Posner and Easterbrook, for example, are said to do all of their opinion writing themselves, whereas
others are reputed to leave all of the opinion writing to their clerks.  See Martha Middleton, Shaping a
Circuit in the Chicago School Image, NAT’L L.J., July 20, 1987, at 1, 34.
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judges on a number of the other circuits do not feel similarly unconstrained.192
This difference creates the potential for an inter-circuit differential in publica-
tion rates.  Specifically, the difference in norms will produce across the circuits
a disparity in their relative influence over the development of federal law.
Similarly, the availability of the JO can cause a difference in power and influ-
ence within a circuit that accepts its use in harder cases.
Table IV (see page 211) contains publication numbers for individual active
judges on the Third Circuit for a two-year period from 1995 to 1997.  The dis-
parity among the judges in the number of majority opinions published is appar-
ent.  For example, the judge at the low end published twenty-one majority
opinions, while Judge Edward R. Becker, the judge at the high end, published
forty-eight during the same period.  Judge Becker’s production was well over
twice that of the low end, but that was still significantly fewer opinions than any
First Circuit judge.  Similar disparities exist within the entire Third Circuit.  Of
the twelve active judges, four judges published between twenty-one and
twenty-nine majority opinions, another four between thirty and thirty-nine, and
the other four between forty and forty-eight majority opinions.  Individual
judges on the Third Circuit, in other words, have significantly different influ-
ence levels over the development of precedent.  Our initial hypothesis is that
the extensive availability of the JO in this circuit was, at least in part, responsi-
ble for the creation of this difference.193
The number of opinions alone, however, is a rough and imprecise estimate
of an opinion’s influence.  It is possible, for instance, that the judges with high
publication rates, such as Judge Becker on the Third Circuit and the judges on
the First Circuit, have higher publication rates because they publish many short
opinions in easy cases.  Tables V and VI (see pages 212-13) contain data on the
average length of opinions and citation rates for judges on the First and Third
Circuits.  (Neither the length of opinions nor the number of citations is a per-
fect measure of the importance of an opinion, but they are our best measures
for now.194)  The tables show that neither the same dramatic differences in
opinion length nor in citation rate are indications that the judges who publish
more are publishing opinions in easier cases:  The judges publishing a signifi-
cantly larger number of opinions were neither writing significantly shorter nor
less-cited opinions.  In fact, using the per-case rate of citation by other circuits
                                                          
192. Cf. Motz, supra note 90, at 1038 (expressing the hope that the norm on the Fourth Circuit will
shift to one that allows the disposition of some fraction of cases with one-line orders).
193. The fact that the Third Circuit’s recent move away from the use of the JO has resulted in an
increase in the fraction of published opinions tends to support the hypothesis.  See supra note 172.
194. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 182-92 (1995) (using the number of citations
to a judge’s opinions as a rough measure of quality).
The length of an opinion and the number of citations to it can be misleading measures of the diffi-
culty of the issues tackled.  For example, while harder issues make for longer opinions, the extensive
use of law clerks also probably makes for longer opinions.  See POSNER, supra note 4, at 146.  Differ-
ences in length of opinion, therefore, may be primarily measuring differences in the use of law clerks.
Opinions written in highly litigated and published areas are also likely to be more frequently cited.  See
William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges,
27 J. LEG. STUD. 271, 271 (1998) (describing the problems inherent in judicial citation studies).
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as an indication of the difficulty or importance of the issues tackled, Judge
Becker’s per-case citation rate is the second highest in the Third Circuit195 (the
highest is that of Judge Timothy K. Lewis).  Furthermore, Judge Selya’s per-
case citation rate by outside circuits (Judge Selya, with ninety-five published
majority opinions, is the high publisher on the First Circuit) was third in the
pool of First and Third Circuit judges.196
Tables IV through VI (see pages 211-13) illustrate three phenomena: the
disparity in publication rates among individual judges on the Third Circuit, the
disparity in publication rates between judges on the First and Third Circuits,
and the lack of corresponding disparities among the opinion citation rate or
opinion length of high and low publishers.  Given these observations, the ques-
tion has to be asked:  Are those who publish more simply choosing to publish
more of their difficult cases than their colleagues?  It may be that the data on
citation rates are misleading and that being cited more is largely a function of
writing style (for example, a propensity to restate hornbook propositions) and
does not correlate well with the difficulty of the substantive law issue tackled.
Maybe those who publish more are doing no more than publishing more of
their easy cases, but the hard question must be asked.197
B. Publication Behavior Across the Circuits
Having examined the individual publication rates for active judges on the
Third Circuit, the next comparison is the individual publication rate for judges
on the other circuits.  The majority of these other circuits did not use the JO at
all, while the JO was the dominant method of case disposition in the Third Cir-
cuit when we began our study.  Individual judge- and total-circuit publication
rates from the other circuits demonstrate wide differences in publication prac-
tices both within and across the circuits.
Once again, as Table VII (see page 214) demonstrates, the disparities
among the circuits are dramatic.  At one extreme are the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits, where active judges produced, on average, between thirty
and forty published majority opinions over the two-year period.  At the other
extreme are the judges on the Seventh Circuit, who produced 112.5 majority
opinions, judges on the Eighth, 97.5, and judges on the First, 75.8.  (Recall from
Table III (see page 210) that the difficulty-adjusted caseload burdens for these
                                                          
195. Judge Becker’s per-case influence ranking turns out to be one of the highest in the country.
See Landes et al., supra note 194, at 308 tbl.4A (ranking Judge Becker as fourth in a pool of 205 fed-
eral appellate judges).  Among judges who were both in our pool (judges active between the period
Aug. 1, 1995, and Aug. 1, 1997) and in that of Landes (judges with six years or more of tenure in 1995),
Judge Becker ranked first in the country in per-case influence.  See infra tbl. XII.
196. Judge Selya’s per-case influence ranking, like that of Judge Becker, is also one of the highest
in the country.  See infra tbl. XII (average influence is per case influence).
197. In fairness, it should be pointed out that the Third Circuit’s publication rates would not look so
low were they to be compared to those of the Fourth or Eleventh Circuits instead of the First or Sev-
enth.  See infra tbl. VII.  It also should be pointed out that we would most likely see a quantity/quality
trade-off were we to compare the citation rates of Third Circuit opinions to those on the Eighth Circuit
instead of the First.  See infra note 196.
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circuits were roughly equal, except for the Eleventh Circuit, which had an un-
usually high caseload burden.)
Between the three law-abundant circuits and the three law-starved circuits
are the other six circuits.  These circuits, the D.C., Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and Tenth, had individual active judges publishing an average of between forty
and fifty-five majority opinions over the period we examined.198  There are a
number of interesting differences in the individual publication rates of the
judges—and with one exception we shall let the tables speak for themselves.
The one exception is Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit.  Over
our two-year period, Judge Posner authored 181 majority opinions.  The low
publisher on the Third Circuit authored twenty-one majority opinions over the
same period, while Judge Becker, the high publisher on the Third Circuit,
authored forty-eight.  There were also a number of judges from circuits other
than the Third who published fewer than twenty majority opinions over the
two-year period for which we collected data.  Judge Posner’s influence on the
development of legal doctrine is significant through his academic writings
alone.  Judge Posner’s opinions are also given greater deference because of his
academic reputation.199  The data demonstrate that there is a third avenue by
which Judge Posner is having a disproportionate influence on the law—the
sheer volume of majority opinions he publishes.  Furthermore, Judge Posner’s
opinions are written in a straightforward but fully theorized law-and-economics
framework easily applicable to other cases, thereby magnifying his influence.200
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook, Posner’s comrade-in-arms in promulgating Chi-
cago-style law-and-economics reasoning, published 127 majority opinions dur-
ing this period.  The combined output of these two judges amounted to more
                                                          
198. The citation rate comparison of the judges on the First and Third Circuits demonstrates that
producing a high volume of opinions does not necessarily entail a drop in the quality of individual
opinions.  Numbers from the Landes study that we have reproduced in Table XII in the Appendix (see
page 223) confirm that judges in certain high-opinion-volume circuits such as the First and the Seventh
Circuits (Judges Posner, Easterbrook, and Selya being prime examples) are not making a significant
sacrifice in terms of opinion quality vis-à-vis their colleagues on the Third Circuit.  See Landes et al.,
supra note 194, at 318 (stating that frequently, as on the First and Seventh Circuits, the “more able and
energetic judges produce both more and higher quality opinions”).  It is interesting to note, however,
that the opinions of the most prolific opinion writers on the Eighth Circuit (who, unlike the judges on
the First and Seventh Circuits, do use the JO in a significant number of cases) are among the least
cited.  Judge Wollman, for example, ranks second in the country in terms of number of majority opin-
ions, but has a per case citation rate that is one of the lowest in the country.  See infra tbl. XII.  The
norm of high volume, therefore, does not necessarily come with high difficulty in cases.
199. Students in one of our seminars (Theory of Contracts) regularly write papers on selected
opinions of Judge Posner and both of us teach out of casebooks that contain numerous opinions by
Judge Posner.
200. We use the term “fully theorized opinion” to describe one that describes the goals and pur-
poses of the statute or common law rule at issue and then articulates a theoretical framework for de-
ciding the case that can be applied to decide later cases.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword—Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (1996) (contrasting maximalist or fully theorized reason-
ing with minimalist reasoning, the latter process involving a tendency to think analogically and by close
reference to actual and hypothetical cases).
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than 300 published majority opinions in a two-year period.  This is well over
half the output of the twelve active judges on the Third Circuit at that time.201
The publication rates of Posner and Easterbrook, while dramatic in com-
parison to judges on the Third Circuit, are somewhat less dramatic compared to
the other judges on the Seventh Circuit.  There, Judges Cummings and Manion,
with eighty-nine majority opinions each, were at the low end of the scale (Judge
Becker, the high publisher on the Third Circuit, published fewer than fifty).  In
the Seventh Circuit, therefore, the norm was to generate law.  In contrast, in the
Third Circuit, the norm appears to have been one of not making law.202
As noted above, the JO was the primary method of case disposition on the
Third Circuit, while the majority of the other circuits did not use it at all.  As
the data on publication rates across the circuits show, however, the acceptabil-
ity of using the JO in the Third (and to a lesser extent on the Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuits) was but one of the norms creating the variation in behavior
across the circuits.  A number of other norms also contributed to the differ-
ences in publication rates.  For example, the Fourth Circuit, which did not use
the JO, and the Eleventh Circuit, which used the JO far less frequently than the
Third, had publication numbers as low as the Third Circuit.  The development
of alternative norms in these other circuits likely explains the reduced creation
of law in these circuits.
Tables VIII, IX, X, and XI (see pages 220-23) reveal norm variations across
the circuits.  Table VIII displays the fraction of cases that resulted in published
opinions in the period from 1989 to 1996.  The differences in the numbers of
opinions published appear on this table as well.  The First, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits published opinions in a significantly higher percentage of their cases
than the Third, Fourth, or Eleventh Circuits.  For example, in 1996, the First,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits published 56.1%, 44.1%, and 36.3% of their re-
spective decisions, while the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits published
only 13.7%, 10%, and 16.6% of their decisions respectively.  The contrasting
norms of high and low publication remained relatively stable over the seven-
year period our data covers.
Recall that Table II (see page 209) described the use of the JO across the
circuits from 1989 to 1996.  Tables IX and X (see pages 221-22) present data on
the use of the two other short-form methods of disposing cases without pub-
                                                          
201. The Landes study reports that Judges Posner and Easterbrook rank first and third in the coun-
try in terms of their total influence on the law (as measured by citations).  See Landes et al., supra note
194, at 288 tbl.2A; infra tbl. XII.
202. Table VII (see page 214) also shows differences in circuit practices in terms of the practice of
writing separately.  On the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, three circuits that produce relatively
small quantities of law, 16%, 17%, and 10%, respectively, of the opinions written are dissents.  In con-
trast, in the law-generating First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, the respective dissent percentages are
4%, 4%, and 5%.  Because the norm is to write a dissent when one disagrees, our hypothesis is that a
larger value is attached to disagreeing on the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, whereas disagree-
ment is generally frowned upon on the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, leading judges to disagree
only under extreme circumstances.  To the extent one sees dissents and concurrences (for which the
numbers are similar) as signals of problems in an opinion, certain circuits send these signals a lot more
often than others.
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lishing: signed, unpublished opinions and unsigned, unpublished opinions.  As
with the JO, these methods of disposition are used extensively in some circuits
and not others; also as with the JO, these differences in use are not readily ex-
plained by differences in per-judge caseload or the level of difficulty of the
caseload.  In 1996, for example, the Second and Tenth Circuits used the signed,
unpublished opinion (Table IX) for disposition in approximately seventy per-
cent of their cases.  The Third and Sixth Circuits came next, using this method
in only 23.8% and 9.1% of their cases.  The rest of the circuits rarely used this
method.  Once again, our hypothesis is that the evolution of different norms in
the different circuits accounts for these differences.203
A similar pattern appears in the use of the unsigned, unpublished opinion.
Table X (see page 222) shows that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits used this
method of disposition in more than seventy-five percent of their cases, while
the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits used the method in very few cases.204
Finally, Table XI (see page 223) examines the differences across circuits in
the grant of oral argument.  In 1996, the Second Circuit granted oral argument
in 62.2% of its cases, while the Third and Fourth Circuits granted oral argu-
ment in only 26.8% and 26.9% of cases respectively.  The culture on the Second
Circuit may consider the grant of oral argument as more important than the
cultures on the Third and Fourth Circuits.205
This article merely scratches the surface of what these differences in norms
are, what the differences mean to the process of appellate adjudication, and
how the differences arise.  Take, for example, the differences in Tables IX and
X.  Some circuits use the signed, unpublished opinion in a majority of cases,
while a number of others use the unsigned, unpublished opinion.  What do
these differences mean in practice?  Are unsigned opinions primarily drafted
by staff attorneys while signed opinions are drafted by the judges themselves?
Similarly, what does it mean to the process of judicial reasoning when a circuit
denies oral argument in a majority of its cases?  Does it mean that the judges
                                                          
203. Table IX contains two examples of large norm shifts.  In 1989, the Second Circuit was not us-
ing the signed, unpublished opinion and the Tenth Circuit was using it in 23.9% of its cases.  In 1990,
however, the numbers jumped.  The Second Circuit was now using this method of disposition in 35.2%
of its cases and the Tenth Circuit in 51.7%.  In 1991, the Second Circuit’s numbers jumped yet again,
this time to 62.2%.  The numbers for the other circuits, in contrast, have remained relatively stable.
Norms within circuits tend to shift more easily than formally sanctioned rules.  Thus, for example,
Ruggero J. Aldisert, a former Chief Judge in the Third Circuit, felt “an opinion should be published
when the judgment of the trial court is reversed.”  Selya, supra note 21, at 413 (citing RUGGERO J.
ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 21 (1990)).
204. Table X shows the flip side of the norm shifts in Table IX in use of the unsigned, unpublished
opinion which drastically dropped in the Second and Tenth Circuits in 1990 and 1991.
205. See, e.g., Statement of the Honorable Jon O. Newman before the Comm. on Structural Alter-
natives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals (Apr. 24, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/new
york/0424NEWM.htm> (“Our circuit is the last one in the nation that still offers oral argument to par-
ties, including unincarcerated pro se litigants.”); see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note 13, at 280
(noting the Fourth Circuit’s requirement of “a statement explaining why argument is desirable”); Ste-
phen L. Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument, 65 JUDICATURE 340
(1982).  Oral argument in England is much longer than the average American appellate argument of
perhaps half an hour.  See COFFIN, supra note 12, at 26-30.
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never discuss the case?  Does a culture of discussion result in fewer dissents?
We have taken a first cut at answering some of these questions in the context of
the Third Circuit’s extensive use of the JO, but the process of analysis has
raised more questions than it has answered.  The biggest new question is why
different norms have developed across the circuits.  These differences do not
appear to be solely a function of differences in caseload.  Instead, factors such
as collegiality, the presence or absence of certain dominant personalities who
set norms,206 initial sets of problems faced by the circuits, and path dependence
are likely at play.  Understanding how these norms form and develop will re-
quire us to go beyond raw numbers and biographies of individual judges to case
studies of the circuits.
VI
CONCLUSION:  INTERNAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS MAY ESTABLISH NEW
JUDICIAL NORMS BY APPLYING DUE PROCESS TO DIFFICULT AREAS OF
DECISIONMAKING
The very nature of judging is called into question by the use of the JO.  In
determining whether its use is primarily a positive development in hard cases,
three sometimes conflicting strands in the conception of judging must be taken
into account: internal judicial norms, concepts of administrative efficiency, and
traditional external norms of judicial accountability and creation of precedents
embodying principles applicable in similar cases.  Perhaps the nature of judging
is changing—as Judge Calabresi put it, our system of jurisprudence may be be-
coming more like a code and less like the old common law.207  Precedent mat-
ters less now.  Is this a sea change?  Or is there a simple economic explanation
for the behavior of the judges:  They are maximizing resources by managing
their dockets at the expense of complete justice in each case.  The problem is
more complex than this, however.  Our central focus in this article has been the
Third Circuit’s past use of the JO.  But the use of the JO, especially in hard
cases, is not a simple matter of judges maximizing resources at the expense of
justice.  Not only do the judges on the Third Circuit work hard, but they also
care deeply about doing justice.  In the context of an overwhelming caseload,
moreover, avoiding a published opinion in some of the harder cases arguably
                                                          
206. The recent elevation of Judge Becker—someone known for his inclination toward publica-
tion—to the position of Chief Judge of the Third Circuit may have contributed to the norm shift away
from the extensive use of the JO.
207. See Guido Calabresi, The New Conservatism in Private Law, Luncheon Address to the 1998
AALS Annual Meeting (available from Recorded Resources Corporation, Tape No. 175).  KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960), articulates the classical
values and norms of opinion writing in the common law tradition.  Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Material
Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1993) (finding a judge-written opinion “rare” today); Ste-
phen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52.  GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164 (1982), urged the courts to use “traditional judicial
methods and modes of reasoning” in dealing with statutory materials.  John Reid worked with these
same traditional approaches in Doe Did Not Sit—The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 59 (1963).
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may be in the interests of justice.  Imagine the scenario this article began with:
a hard case with prima facie equally plausible doctrinal arguments on both
sides, a panel that knows little about the subject area and is likely to make a
number of errors in writing an opinion, and the fact that crafting such an opin-
ion would take significantly more time than the vast majority of other cases be-
fore the judges.  Under these conditions, it is not clear that writing an opinion
would serve either individual justice (there is an equal likelihood of either party
winning), or contribute to the system of precedent (no law may be better than
bad law that would later have to be repudiated).  Thus, the use of the JO in
some hard appellate cases may enhance—by inaction—both justice for the par-
ties, that is, the correction of errors by lower courts, and the development of
precedent.  Nonetheless, the broad availability of the JO does raise a subsidiary
set of troublesome concerns.
First, can we trust that to the extent the JO is used in difficult cases, it is
used only in those with “equally plausible” doctrinal arguments?  What of the
risk that its use might extend to cases in which judges have a slight preference
for one set of arguments, but do not want to exert the effort it would take to
write a publishable opinion?
Second, in theory, the broad availability of the JO should create a bias to-
ward the development of precedent in the areas of law that the judges find im-
portant and away from those areas in which they have little interest.  To the ex-
tent that only one or two judges have an interest in a particular area of the law,
those one or two judges will dominate those areas.
Third, normal differences in power and influence among the judges in a cir-
cuit will be exacerbated.  Ordinarily, disparities in power exist between those
who write narrowly and those who write broadly.  The judges who prefer to
write narrowly aid the broad writers by using the JO in hard cases, which fur-
ther distributes power toward the judges who care more about establishing
their legacy.
Fourth, the use of the JO increases the opportunity for strategic judicial be-
havior.  Two judges inclined to reverse in a close case might agree to affirm
without opinion when the third judge threatens to dissent from a published
opinion ordering reversal; on the other hand, the third judge may agree to vote
for an affirmance if only a nonprecedential JO is used.  The option of using a
JO, therefore, can change the outcome of close cases.
Although avoiding published opinions in certain hard cases may appear
positive on first cut, these secondary effects create potentially negative out-
comes.  It is possible that judges care enough about these secondary effects that
a norm of using the JO in hard cases could never develop.  We simply do not
know.
The hypothesis that use of the JO may have significantly altered the model
of appellate decisionmaking in the Third Circuit leads to a second, more impor-
tant question:  What does this change say about the appellate system as a
whole?  What governs the behavior of circuit judges is not the roughly uniform
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system of formal internal circuit rules, but a system of informal norms of
proper judicial behavior.  Despite the similarities in the circuits’ work and
caseload, the circuits have not converged to a single optimal set of norms.
Radically different norms have developed across the circuits.  For example,
while the judges in the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits found it acceptable
to use the JO in a large proportion of their cases, the judges in other circuits
strongly disagreed.  Publication rates across circuits suggest similar extreme dif-
ferences in norms about the propriety of publishing dissenting, concurring, and
majority opinions.  Similar differentials in norms probably exist regarding the
propriety of practices such as delegating work to staff attorneys or law clerks.
The supposedly uniform appellate system, therefore, is one in which similar
cases receive significantly different treatment in different circuits.  Further-
more, precedent is created differently across the circuits.  In one circuit pro se
and social security cases may be decided entirely by judges, while in another
this authority may have been delegated to a team of staff attorneys.  Similarly,
tax and securities cases may be largely authored by law clerks in some circuits,
not authored at all in other circuits, and authored by the judges themselves in
the remaining circuits.  The publication rates across circuits suggest these dif-
ferences.  For example, judges on the Seventh Circuit appear to have a norm of
publishing a great deal, while there is a contrary norm on the Third, Fourth,
and Eleventh Circuits.  The result is that judges on the Seventh Circuit produce
on average more than three times as many published majority opinions as col-
leagues on these other circuits.  Thus, a President making a nomination to a
Court of Appeals should realize that appointing someone to the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which has a high rate of publication, will have a significantly different im-
pact on the law than appointing the same person to the Third Circuit.208
It is our view that more than administrative efficiency is at the heart of judi-
cial decisionmaking.  Professor Milsom examined the structure of social obliga-
tions under which current changes in judicial decisionmaking are taking place—
a world of Medicare, social security, insurance applications, and other adminis-
trative management by zoning and planning boards.209  The problem this pres-
ents to the common law tradition is the pressure of detail throwing the law off
the center of its principles.  “Complexity defies specification . . . and in the end
you have to leave it to somebody’s discretion.”210  If that somebody turns out to
be, for example, the insurance industry, and the subject is no-fault automobile
                                                          
208. The existence of these different norms across circuits should, in theory, also be important to
law students seeking clerkships.  If the value of a clerkship lies primarily in the training it provides (as
opposed to in the prestige of having obtained the clerkship), the existence of different norms for the
use of law clerks in the drafting process, the publication of majority opinions, the writing of separate
opinions, and the grant of oral argument significantly impacts the type of experience a law clerk has.
209. S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 218 (1985), observed that
“judge-made law is the product of many individuals working separately, and not just of more or less
stable groups; and the number of reportable decisions is of course greatly increased.”  Similarly,
POSNER, supra note 10, at 17, suggests that “the judge is, at least if he wants to be, principal rather
than agent.”
210. Milsom, supra note 209, at 221.
GULATI.FMT 04/01/99  5:01 PM
206 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 3
accidents, then judicial discretion is not being applied to tort law.211  The extra-
legal decisions of the specialist insurers, however, are not necessarily better
than the decisions created by the judicial discretion exercised previously by
generalist judges in that area of tort law.212
Professor Milsom suggests that the moral authority of the law might be re-
stored, not by writing ever-more detailed precedent about less and less, but by
increasing the importance of due process in the exercise of judicial discretion.213
Elementary ideas of fairness might restore the moral authority of the law if
fairness, or due process, is applied to the institutions that affect people’s daily
lives, such as the social security or planning boards, or even highly specialized
courts, which may do wrong to individuals appearing before them unless the
courts restrain their activities in accordance with due process.
How can or should individual circuit norms be unified?  Should a federal
task force study the problem?  Would reconstituting the circuits so that they
hear cases by subject matter and have the same numbers of judges have the de-
sired effect?  Should the number of appellate judgeships be doubled?214  Per-
haps, but there may not be an immediate need for dramatic reform.  Whether
the problems lie in the failure to publish in hard cases, an excessive use of law
clerks, or too much delegation to staff attorneys, each problem is a function of
internal norms.  Norms are inherently flexible, and information can alter them.
This is especially true in the case of small, closely knit groups—such as federal
appellate judges—who care greatly about their reputation and the esteem in
which others hold them.
Academic legal commentary has traditionally focused on the careful study
of appellate opinions.  With few exceptions, the study of the institutions that
generate these opinions, the incentives of the judges, and the internal rules and
practices that govern them has been largely left to scholars outside law schools.
As a result, legal academics have provided the circuits with little feedback on
their practices.  We are optimistic, however, that this will change.  In recent
years, both institutional analysis and the study of norms have received consid-
erable attention from legal academics.  We hope that the statistics in this article
demonstrate that the courts are ripe for an extended analysis of judicial norms.
Perhaps what is most difficult about the use of the JO or other equivalent
short-form dispositions in hard cases is that the common law tradition is so
connected to the notion of due process that a JO seems unfair in a hard case.  If
                                                          
211. See id.
212. See generally Wood, supra note 179 (describing the value of preserving a system of judicial de-
cisionmaking by generalist judges).
213. See Milsom, supra note 209, at 222.  Using tax codes and tax avoidance, Professor Milsom con-
cludes that avoidance is not stopped and the law is not respected.  He suggests “it would be wiser and
more just to accept guidelines for a discretion rather than a capricious multitude of rules, and to con-
centrate the law upon ensuring that the discretion is properly exercised. . . .  It is in such control that
the important future lies for judge-made law.”  Id.
214. Cf. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 3, at 60 (recommending that the cir-
cuits be allowed to experiment with the use of two-judge panels in certain cases and with district court
appellate panels).
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complexity in society and exploding dockets require decisionmaking by spe-
cialized courts or even bodies other than courts, the concept of due process
could be refashioned simply from the common law tradition to provide a solu-
tion:  The courts in difficult cases should be ensuring, and be seen to be ensur-
ing, that the process by which decisions are made is fair.  The increasing burden
of cases prevents courts from being seen to do justice in these difficult areas.
Precedent is being made, as Posner and Milsom point out, in ever narrower ar-
eas.  Doing justice and shielding right from wrong in individual cases must be
seen as remaining at the core of the judicial system.  Posner looks outside the
law to statistics and economics.  Milsom looks to due process as the heart of
moral authority in the justice system.  The two can be combined.
The application of social and economic knowledge can shape our concep-
tion of fair process in the context of growing caseloads, complex factual situa-
tions, and expanding administrative spheres that threaten to devour the judicial
system unless the system masters the situation by also imposing fair procedures
on those extra-judicial decisionmakers who affect people’s vital interests as
much as judges do.215  Continuing emphasis on the judicial responsibility “to
keep government generally within the bounds of law”216 is especially important
when the judiciary itself is pressured by finite resources to dispatch cases in ac-
cordance with computer docket printouts rather than the actual complexity of
the cases themselves.217  Judges govern themselves, and only judges can change
the way they decide cases.  But outsiders can observe, analyze, and provide the
impetus for change.218
                                                          
215. The notions of due process and the rule of law were long ago articulated for shaping adminis-
trative discretion, as LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965),
wrote in detailing the scope of judicial review for administrative action.  Looking back historically,
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 4-7 (1990), traced the emergence of this fair process in the agencies.
216. Fallon, supra note 181, at 53 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1777-91 (1991)).
217. Robert E. Keeton, Times Are Changing for Trials in Court, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 15
(1993), rhetorically described the tyranny of the docket in trial courts as casting the judges as
“Terminator,” lacking the time to “worry . . . about terminating justly.”
218. We recognize that there is a danger that the publication of statistics on the publication and ci-
tation rates of individual judges brings with it the risk of an undue focus on those statistics.  People do
tend to overweigh that which is visible and rankable and underweigh that which is subjective.  See
Robert Gibbons, Incentives in Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115 (1998).  However, the solution to
that problem is not to keep these statistics hidden, but to recognize their shortcomings and use them in
that context.
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TABLE I
THIRD CIRCUIT: PERCENTAGE OF CASES DISPOSED
OF WITHOUT COMMENT, 1989-1996
Year Total Number of
Cases
Number of Cases Dis-
posed of Without
Comment
Percentage of Cases
Disposed of Without
Comment
1989 1,481   774 52.3%
1990 1,551   827 53.3%
1991 1,526   918 60.1%
1992 1,613   950 58.9%
1993 1,853 1,144 61.7%
1994 1,975 1,204 61.0%
1995 2,151 1,219 56.7%
1996 1,927 1,200 62.3%
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE II
NUMBER OF CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT COMMENT BY CIRCUIT, 1989-1996
(TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS IN PARENTHESES)
Year
Circuit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
D.C. 31
(803)
4
(615)
0
(695)
6
(706)
0
(799)
4
(785)
1
(725)
0
(661)
1st 27
(747)
15
(728)
10
(721)
4
(744)
5
(858)
0
(742)
0
(785)
0
(774)
2d 4
(1,100)
9
(1,246)
0
(1,566)
0
(1,468)
4
(1,653)
0
(1,861)
0
(1,931)
0
(1,832)
3d 774
(1,481)
827
(1,551)
918
(1,526)
950
(1,613)
1,144
(1,853)
1,204
(1,975)
1,219
(2,151)
1,200
(1,927)
4th 69
(1,794)
1
(2,154)
0
(2,141)
0
(2,066)
0
(2,260)
1
(2,459)
0
(2,887)
0
(2,969)
5th 47
(2,441)
64
(2,659)
63
(2,681)
95
(2,922)
89
(3,348)
82
(3,409)
107
(3,913)
92
(3,922)
6th 0
(2,369)
0
(2,359)
0
(2,475)
0
(2,350)
0
(2,124)
0
(2,473)
0
(2,187)
2
(2,067)
7th 78
1,097)
94
(1,226)
23
(1,441)
32
(1,448)
51
(1,709)
34
(1,768)
48
(1,819)
41
(1,549)
8th 16
(1,370)
398
(1,716)
434
(1,884)
374
(1,946)
573
(2,124)
492
(1,986)
605
(2,202)
570
(2,108)
9th 338
(2,794)
159
(2,943)
175
(3,608)
233
(3,910)
349
(4,599)
218
(4,645)
151
(4,480)
140
(4,321)
10th 3
(1,228)
3
(1,699)
3
(1,629)
1
(1,677)
0
(1,543)
0
(1,681)
0
(1,766)
0
(1,878)
11th 658
(2,098)
647
(2,074)
697
(2,340)
792
(2,312)
1,086
(2,697)
922
(2,691)
964
(3,341)
633
(2,981)
Total 2,045 2,221 2,323 2,487 3,301 2,957 3,095 2,678
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE III
JUDGES’ WORKLOAD BY CIRCUIT, 1993
Circuit No. of
authorized
judgeships
No. of
cases ter-
minated
on the
merits
No. of
cases per
judgeship
Workload;
adjusted for
difficulty level
(rank in pa-
rentheses)
No. of
signed,
published
opinions
No. of signed,
published
opinions per
judgeship
(rank in paren-
theses)
D.C. 12   799  66.6  148.0 (12) 244  20.3 (12)
1st  6   858 143.0 285.0  (8) 502 83.4  (1)
2d 13 1,653 127.2 367.1  (3) 469 58.6  (4)
3d 14 1,853 132.4 277.9  (9) 346 24.7  (9)
4th 15 2,260 150.7 290.8  (6) 328  21.9 (11)
5th 17 3,348 197.9 426.2  (2) 713 41.9  (6)
6th 16 2,124 132.8 299.4  (5) 362  22.6 (10)
7th 11 1,709 155.4 286.8  (7) 792 72.0  (2)
8th 11 2,124 193.1  277.4 (10) 785 71.4  (3)
9th 28 4,599 164.3 337.4  (4) 711 25.4  (8)
10th 12 1,543 128.6  228.7 (11) 589 49.1  (5)
11th 12 2,697 224.8 482.9  (1) 358 29.8  (7)
SOURCES: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1993);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM tbl.7.6 (1996).
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TABLE IV
FIRST AND THIRD CIRCUIT PUBLICATION NUMBERS
BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 1995, AND AUGUST 1, 1997
Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
1st Juan Torruella 87 1 1 89
Bruce Selya 95 2 2 99
Michael Boudin 68 0 3 71
Norman Stahl 59 0 3 62
Sandra Lynch 70 3 5 78
Average 75.8 1.2 2.8 79.8
Standard Deviation 14.8 1.3 1.5 14.6
% of Total Opinions 95% 1% 4% 100%
3d Dolores Sloviter 41 1 4 46
Edward Becker 48 2 9 59
Walter Stapleton 32 8 9 49
Carol Los Mansmann 29 0 6 35
Morton Greenberg 44 1 7 52
Anthony Scirica 32 1 5 38
Robert Cowen 40 0 4 44
Richard Nygaard 35 2 3 40
Samuel Alito, Jr. 27 0 17 44
Jane Roth 32 0 7 39
Timothy Lewis 25 1 6 32
Theodore McKee 21 4 5 30
Average 33.8 1.7 6.8 42.3
Standard Deviation 8.1 2.3 3.7 8.4
% of Total Opinions 80% 4% 16% 100%
SOURCE: Westlaw searches by authors.
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TABLE V
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS TO WRITE OPINIONS AND AVERAGE LENGTH
OF OPINIONS FOR FIRST AND THIRD CIRCUIT JUDGES
BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 1995, AND AUGUST 1, 1997
(RANKINGS IN PARENTHESES)
Circuit Judge Number of
Opinions
Total
Days
Average
Days
Total
Pages
Average
Pages
1st Torruella 87 10,863 125 (10*) 1,994 23
Selya 95 5,005   53 (2) 2,052 22
Boudin 68 6,967 102 (7) 1,083 16
Stahl 59 5,366   91 (6) 1,481 25
Lynch 70 4,165   60 (3) 1,688 24
Average 76 6,473 86 1,660 22
Standard Deviation 14.8 2,656 29.9 397.2 3.5
3d Sloviter 41 4,632 113 (9) 870 21
Becker 48 6,571 137 (12) 1,363 28
Stapleton 32 4,765 149 (13) 890 28
Los Mansmann 29 2,257   78 (5) 846 29
Greenberg 44 1,688   38 (1) 1,125 26
Scirica 32 3,590 112 (8) 805 25
Cowen 40 2,732   68 (4) 1,020 26
Nygaard 35 4,362 125 (10*) 565 16
Alito 27 4,041 150 (14) 913 34
Roth 32 5,948 186 (16) 840 26
Lewis 25 3,853 154 (15) 662 26
McKee 21 4,307 205 (17) 664 32
Average 34 4,062 126 880 26
Standard Deviation 8.1 1,406 48.3 216.6 4.7
SOURCE: Westlaw searches by authors.
* Tie.
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TABLE VI
FIRST AND THIRD CIRCUIT CITATION RATES
BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 1995, AND AUGUST 1, 1997
(NUMBER OF CITES PER OPINION IN PARENTHESES)
Circuit Judge
Number of
Times
Judge
Cited Own
Opinions
Number of
Same-Circuit
Opinions
Citing Judge’s
Opinions
Number
of Cites
by Other
Circuits
Number of
Cites by Dis-
trict Courts
in the Same
Circuit
Number
of Cites by
District
Courts in
Other Cir-
cuits
1st Torruella 54 (0.6) 158 (1.8) 71 (0.8) 218 (2.5) 65 (0.7)
Selya 136 (1.4) 279 (2.9) 137 (1.4) 268 (2.8) 143 (1.5)
Boudin 36 (0.5) 121 (1.8) 70 (1.0) 59 (0.9) 36 (0.5)
Stahl 25 (0.4) 147 (2.5) 53 (0.9) 171 (2.9) 64 (1.0)
Lynch 89 (1.3) 134 (1.9) 84 (1.2) 77 (1.1) 83 (1.2)
Average 68 (0.8) 168 (2.2) 83 (1.1) 159 (2.0) 78 (1.0)
Standard
Deviation 45.1 (0.5) 63.7 (0.5) 32.1 (0.2) 89.8 (1.0) 39.9 (0.4)
3d Sloviter 3 (0.1) 57 (1.4) 40 (1.0) 201 (4.9) 33 (0.8)
Becker 8 (0.2) 46 (1.0) 78 (1.6) 149 (3.1) 51 (1.1)
Stapleton 6 (0.2) 24 (0.8) 30 (0.9) 173 (5.4) 16 (0.5)
Mansmann 6 (0.2) 29 (1.0) 36 (1.2) 157 (5.4) 61 (2.1)
Greenberg 6 (0.1) 34 (0.8) 35 (0.8) 125 (2.8) 35 (0.8)
Scirica 4 (0.1) 26 (0.8) 30 (0.9) 103 (3.2) 26 (0.8)
Cowen 13 (0.3) 40 (1.0) 38 (1.0) 202 (5.0) 58 (1.5)
Nygaard 1 (0.0) 28 (0.8) 21 (0.6) 111 (3.2) 25 (0.7)
Alito 3 (0.1) 26 (1.0) 27 (1.0) 76 (2.8) 23 (0.9)
Roth 4 (0.1) 25 (0.8) 23 (0.7) 123 (3.8) 40 (1.3)
Lewis 4 (0.2) 23 (0.9) 51 (2.0) 106 (4.2) 39 (1.6)
McKee 2 (0.1) 20 (1.0) 26 (1.2) 120 (5.7) 33 (1.6)
Average 5 (0.1) 31.5 (0.9) 36.3 (1.1) 137.1 (4.1) 34.2 (1.1)
Standard
Deviation 3.2 (0.1) 11.0 (0.2) 15.5 (0.4) 39.7 (1.1) 14.0 (0.5)
SOURCE: Westlaw searches by authors.
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TABLE VII
PUBLICATION NUMBERS BY CIRCUIT
BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 1995, AND AUGUST 1, 1997
Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
D.C. Harry Edwards 50 4 6 60
Patricia Wald 57 6 19 82
Laurence Silberman 49 9 4 62
Stephen Williams 51 1 5 57
Douglas Ginsburg 64 3 3 70
David Sentelle 53 7 7 67
Karen LeCraft Henderson 40 7 12 59
A. Raymond Randolph 47 0 5 52
Judith Rogers 49 5 6 60
David Tatel 51 4 12 67
Average 51.1 4.6 7.9 63.6
Standard Deviation 6.3 2.8 5.0 8.4
% of Total Opinions 80% 8% 12% 100%
1st Juan Torruella 87 1 1 89
Bruce Selya 95 2 2 99
Michael Boudin 68 0 3 71
Norman Stahl 59 0 3 62
Sandra Lynch 70 3 5 78
Average 75.8 1.2 2.8 79.8
Standard Deviation 14.8 1.3 1.5 14.6
% of Total Opinions 95% 1% 4% 100%
2d Amalya Kearse 66 1 4 71
Ralph Winter, Jr. 69 2 4 75
John Walker, Jr. 63 2 2 67
Joseph McLaughlin 49 0 0 49
Dennis Jacobs 58 5 9 72
Pierre Leval 46 0 1 47
Guido Calabresi 47 1 3 51
Jose Cabranes 42 1 1 44
Fred Parker 48 0 2 50
Average 54.2 1.3 2.9 58.4
Standard Deviation 9.9 1.6 2.7 12.5
% of Total Opinions 93% 2% 5% 100%
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Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
3d Dolores Sloviter 41 1 4 46
Edward Becker 48 2 9 59
Walter Stapleton 32 8 9 49
Carol Los Mansmann 29 0 6 35
Morton Greenberg 44 1 7 52
Anthony Scirica 32 1 5 38
Robert Cowen 40 0 4 44
Richard Nygaard 35 2 3 40
Samuel Alito, Jr. 27 0 17 44
Jane Roth 32 0 7 39
Timothy Lewis 25 1 6 32
Theodore McKee 21 4 5 30
Average 33.8 1.7 6.8 42.3
Standard Deviation 8.1 2.3 3.7 8.4
% of Total Opinions 80% 4% 16% 100%
4th J. Harvie Wilkinson 58 8 8 74
Donald Russell 29 0 3 32
H. Emory Widener, Jr. 31 0 8 39
Kenneth Hall 28 0 24 52
Francis Murnaghan, Jr. 48 3 14 65
Sam Ervin III 42 0 2 44
William Wilkins, Jr. 44 3 0 47
Paul Niemeyer 58 3 8 69
Clyde Hamilton 34 1 4 39
J. Michael Luttig 32 8 10 50
Karen Williams 32 3 3 38
M. Blane Michael 24 0 15 39
Diana Motz 41 3 10 54
Average 38.5 2.5 8.4 49.4
Standard Deviation 11.1 2.8 6.5 13.1
% of Total Opinions 78% 5% 17% 100%
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Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
5th Henry Politz 68 0 5 73
Carolyn King 18 1 1 20
E. Grady Jolly 51 0 4 55
Patrick Higginbotham 65 0 0 65
W. Eugene Davis 37 0 1 38
Edith Jones 39 3 7 49
Jerry Smith 71 0 10 81
John Duhe, Jr. 59 1 1 61
Jacques Wiener, Jr. 55 3 3 61
Rhesa Barksdale 26 0 5 31
Emilio Garza 63 8 10 81
Harold DeMoss, Jr. 52 0 12 64
Fortunato Benavides 68 2 6 76
Carl Stewart 64 0 1 65
Robert Parker 69 1 3 73
Average 53.7 1.3 4.6 59.5
Standard Deviation 16.6 2.2 3.8 18.1
% of Total Opinions 90% 2% 8% 100%
6th Gilbert Merritt 50 4 12 66
Cornelia Kennedy 77 1 4 82
Boyce Martin, Jr. 54 2 2 58
David Nelson 45 5 9 59
James Ryan 32 9 12 53
Danny Boggs 64 0 7 71
Alan Norris 34 0 3 37
Richard Suhrheinrich 21 0 3 24
Eugene Siler, Jr. 28 0 2 30
Alice Batchelder 25 3 6 34
Martha Craig Daughtrey 13 0 6 19
Karen Nelson Moore 69 1 5 75
Average 42.7 2.1 5.9 50.7
Standard Deviation 20.4 2.8 3.5 21.2
% of Total Opinions 84% 4% 12% 100%
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Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
7th Richard Posner 181 1 3 185
Walter Cummings 89 0 0 89
John Coffey 101 0 6 107
Joel Flaum 129 9 3 141
Frank Easterbrook 127 2 2 131
Kenneth Ripple 118 6 12 136
Daniel Manion 89 3 8 100
Michael Kanne 105 0 2 107
Ilana Diamond Rovner 96 7 9 112
Diane Wood 90 5 5 100
Average 112.5 3.3 5 120.8
Standard Deviation 28.4 3.3 3.7 28.3
% of Total Opinions 93% 3% 4% 100%
8th Richard Arnold 91 0 7 98
Theodore McMillian 85 2 13 100
George Fagg 70 0 0 70
Pasco Bowmn 101 0 0 101
Roger Wollman 133 0 2 135
C. Arlen Beam 115 2 3 120
James Loken 102 2 13 117
David Hansen 95 0 5 100
Morris Arnold 103 0 6 109
Diana Murphy 80 0 2 82
Average 97.5 0.6 5.1 103.2
Standard Deviation 17.9 1.0 4.8 18.6
% of Total Opinions 94% 1% 5% 100%
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Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
9th Proctor Hug, Jr. 42 1 2 45
James Browning 8 0 0 8
Mary Schroeder 45 3 6 54
Betty Fletcher 66 1 13 80
Harry Pregerson 42 1 14 57
Stephen Reinhardt 57 7 18 82
Cynthia Holcomb Hall 45 2 3 50
Melvin Brunetti 49 2 3 54
Alex Kozinski 38 6 16 60
David Thompson 79 0 0 79
Diarmuid O’Scannlain 64 4 16 84
Stephen Trott 53 2 8 63
Ferdinand Fernandez 40 2 18 60
Pamela Ann Rymer 42 0 11 53
Thomas G. Nelson 55 1 3 59
Andrew Kleinfeld 53 2 11 66
Michael Hawkins 41 2 3 46
Average 48.2 2.1 8.5 58.8
Standard Deviation 15.1 2.0 6.5 18.0
% of Total Opinions 82% 4% 14% 100%
10th Stephanie Seymour 47 0 3 50
John Porfilio 31 0 1 32
Stephen Anderson 41 0 4 45
Deanell Tacha 57 0 1 58
Bobby Baldock 50 0 2 52
Wade Brorby 83 0 2 85
David Ebel 73 1 3 77
Paul Kelly, Jr. 56 1 6 63
Robert Henry 49 3 1 53
Mary Beck Briscoe 49 1 4 54
Carlos Lucero 29 2 6 37
Average 51.4 0.7 3 55.1
Standard Deviation 16.1 1.0 1.8 15.6
% of Total Opinions 93% 1% 6% 100%
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Circuit Judge Majority
Opinions
Concurring
Opinions
Dissenting
Opinions
Total
Opinions
11th Gerald Tjoflat 36 1 3 40
Joseph Hatchett 38 0 1 39
R. Lanier Anderson III 30 0 6 36
J.L. Edmondson 40 1 1 42
Emmett Cox 19 1 6 26
Stanley Birch, Jr. 43 2 7 52
Joel Dubina 31 0 1 32
Susan Black 19 1 3 23
Edward Carnes 42 1 1 44
Rosemary Barkett 41 4 10 55
Average 33.9 1.1 3.9 38.9
Standard Deviation 9.0 1.2 3.2 10.2
% of Total Opinions 87% 3% 10% 100%
SOURCE: Westlaw searches by authors.
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TABLE VIII
PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN WHICH PUBLISHED OPINIONS WERE ISSUED,
1989-1996
Year
Circuit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
D.C. 44.6% 45.1% 38.6% 40.0% 32.6% 30.0% 39.5% 40.8%
1st 59.2% 63.6% 66.1% 61.9% 62.9% 52.9% 47.4% 56.1%
2d 44.8% 41.3% 37.1% 34.9% 31.6% 35.2% 31.2% 31.1%
3d 24.6% 21.9% 17.2% 20.4% 19.1% 17.0% 17.8% 13.7%
4th 17.1% 15.8% 15.2% 16.9% 15.5% 12.7% 12.3% 10.0%
5th 35.7% 31.8% 28.4% 28.5% 24.4% 21.2% 21.0% 23.3%
6th 22.5% 20.5% 21.4% 21.4% 18.5% 19.7% 18.2% 19.5%
7th 65.0% 54.9% 50.0% 55.5% 48.1% 51.0% 49.3% 44.1%
8th 55.2% 41.0% 45.2% 45.4% 42.7% 43.1% 38.4% 36.5%
9th 35.3% 29.2% 24.6% 23.9% 17.4% 18.8% 21.1% 19.7%
10th 30.5% 29.2% 34.4% 36.8% 39.1% 32.5% 31.1% 24.8%
11th 30.2% 31.0% 31.2% 26.0% 18.5% 17.3% 15.3% 16.6%
Total 35.4% 31.6% 30.6% 30.7% 26.9% 25.6% 24.7% 23.8%
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE IX
FRACTION OF CASES IN WHICH SIGNED, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS WERE
ISSUED, 1989-1996 (PERCENTAGE OF ALL CASES IN PARENTHESES)
Year
Circuit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
D.C. 5/803
(0.6%)
2/615
(0.3%)
0/695
(0%)
0/706
(0%)
0/799
(0%)
0/785
(0%)
2/725
(0.3%)
0/661
(0%)
1st 26/137
(3.5%)
23/728
(3.2%)
23/721
(3.2%)
30/744
(4.0%)
16/858
(1.9%)
41/742
(5.5%)
35/785
(4.5%)
36/1831
(2%)
2d 0/1100
(0%)
438/1246
(35.2%)
974/1566
(62.2%)
946/1468
(64.4%)
1123/1653
(67.9%)
1203/1861
(64.6%)
1325/1931
(68.6%)
1259/1831
(68.8%)
3d 319/1481
(21.5%)
370/1551
(23.9%)
346/1526
(22.7%)
327/1613
(20.3%)
339/1853
(18.3%)
428/1975
(21.7%)
549/2151
(25.5%)
458/1927
(23.8%)
4th 41/1794
(2.2%)
123/2154
(5.7%)
130/2141
(6.1%)
176/2066
(8.5%)
159/2260
(7%)
133/2459
(5.4%)
50/2887
(1.7%)
97/2969
(3.3%)
5th 445/2441
(18.2%)
465/2659
(17.5%)
355/2681
(13.2%)
369/2922
(12.6%)
349/3348
(10.4%)
311/3409
(9.1%)
376/3913
(9.6%)
195/3922
(5%)
6th 133/2369
(5.6%)
147/2395
(6.1%)
117/2475
(4.7%)
133/2350
(5.7%)
104/2124
(4.8%)
121/2473
(4.9%)
140/2187
(6.4%)
190/2067
(9.1%)
7th 6/1097
(0.5%)
6/1226
(0.4%)
0/1441
(0%)
0/1448
(0%)
0/1709
(0%)
1/1768
(0.1%)
5/1819
(0.3%)
11/1549
(.7%)
8th 1/8370
(0%)
4/1716
(0.2%)
1/1884
(0%)
3/1946
(0.2%)
8/2124
(0.4%)
3/1986
(0.2%)
7/2202
(.3%)
3/2108
(0.1%)
9th 1/2794
(0%)
61/2943
(2.1%)
15/3608
(0.4%)
26/3910
(0.7%)
11/4599
(0.2%)
25/4645
(0.5%)
85/4480
(1.9%)
10/4321
(0.2%)
10th 293/1228
(23.9%)
878/1699
(51.7%)
896/1629
(55%)
1009/1677
(60.2%)
906/1543
(58.7%)
1092/1681
(65%)
1196/1766
(67.7%)
1382/1878
(73.6%)
11th 23/2098
(1.1%)
23/2074
(1.1%)
35/2340
(1.5%)
38/2312
(1.6%)
27/2697
(1%)
31/2691
(1.2%)
1196/1766
(67.7%)
1382/1878
(73.6%)
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE X
FRACTION OF CASES IN WHICH UNSIGNED, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS WERE
ISSUED, 1989-1996 (PERCENTAGE OF ALL CASES IN PARENTHESES)
Year
Circuit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
D.C. 409/803
(50.9%)
332/615
(54%)
427/695
(61.4%)
418/706
(59.2%)
539/799
(67.5%)
546/785
(69.6%)
436/725
(60.1%)
391/661
(59.2%)
1st 252/747
(33.7%)
227/728
(31.2%)
212/721
(29.4%)
250/744
(33.6%)
298/858
(34.7%)
309/742
(41.6%)
378/785
(48.2%)
304/774
(39.3%)
2d 599/1100
(54.5%)
281/1246
(22.6%)
7/1566
(4.5%)
0/1468
(0%)
0/1653
(0%)
0/1861
(0%)
0/1931
(0%)
0/1832
(0%)
3d 25/1481
(1.7%)
15/1551
(1%)
0/1526
(0%)
7/1613
(4.3%)
17/1853
(0.9%)
8/1975
(0.4%)
1/2151
(0%)
5/1927
(0.3%)
4th 1378/1794
(76.8%)
1691/2154
(78.5%)
1686/2141
(78.7%)
1541/2066
(74.6%)
1752/2260
(77.5%)
2015/2459
(81.9%)
2483/2887
(86%)
2576/2969
(86.8%)
5th 1079/2441
(44.2%)
1286/2659
(48.4%)
1502/2681
(56%)
1628/2922
(55.7%)
2095/3348
(62.6%)
2295/3409
(67.3%)
2609/3913
(66.7%)
2723/3922
(69.4%)
6th 1605/2369
(67.8%)
1660/2395
(69.3%)
1752/2475
(70.8%)
1653/2390
(70.3%)
1574/2124
(74.1%)
1776/2473
(71.8%)
1562/2187
(71.4%)
1385/2067
(67%)
7th 300/1097
(27.3%)
454/1226
(37%)
698/1441
(48.2%)
613/1448
(42.3%)
836/1709
(48.9%)
833/1768
(47.1%)
871/1819
(47.9%)
814/1549
(52.6%)
8th 597/1370
(43.6%)
611/1716
(35.6%)
599/1884
(31.8%)
687/1946
(35.3%)
638/2124
(30%)
637/1986
(32.1%)
746/2202
(33.9%)
769/2108
(36.5%)
9th 1470/2794
(52.6%)
1886/2943
(63.4%)
2532/3608
(70.2%)
2718/3910(
69.5%)
3441/4599
(74.8%)
3531/4645
(76%)
3302/4480
(73.7%)
3318/4321
(76.8%)
10th 558/1228
(45.4%)
322/1699
(19%)
171/1629
(10.5%)
51/1677
(3%)
35/1543
(2.3%)
43/1681
(2.6%)
22/1766
(1.2%)
30/1878
(1.6%)
11th 784/2098
(37.4%)
762/2074
(36.7%)
878/2340
(37.5%)
883/2312
(38.2%)
1086/2697
(40.3%)
1273/2691
(47.3%)
1844/3341
(55.2%)
1806/2981
(60.6%)
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-3 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE XI
PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN WHICH ORAL ARGUMENT WAS GRANTED,
1989-1996
Year
Circuit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
D.C. 53.7% 57.4% 50.5% 53.4% 44.7% 44.6% 56.3% 52.2%
1st 67.6% 67.6% 67.3% 63.8% 65.6% 59.9% 63.4% 55.9%
2d 80.2% 75.8% 73.4% 71.5% 68.2% 63.1% 62.8% 61.3%
3d 33.0% 27.3% 25.3% 31.2% 30.6% 30.3% 29.7% 26.8%
4th 39.3% 37.3% 35.5% 39.7% 35.3% 32.9% 28.0% 25.6%
5th 33.2% 30.1% 27.0% 29.4% 26.4% 25.6% 32.4% 31.2%
6th 49.6% 49.7% 50.3% 51.5% 47.9% 47.7% 50.8% 50.8%
7th 69.6% 56.8% 53.0% 56.5% 55.0% 60.5% 54.0% 54.0%
8th 55.7% 42.4% 45.8% 45.2% 39.3% 43.5% 37.6% 39.3%
9th 60.8% 49.5% 47.2% 40.3% 34.7% 40.5% 42.4% 41.8%
10th 45.0% 36.9% 33.4% 38.0% 32.6% 31.9% 29.4% 29.8%
11th 45.5% 45.0% 45.3% 42.3% 35.2% 37.3% 32.5% 32.2%
Total 50.4% 45.0% 44.2% 43.9% 39.7% 40.6% 39.9% 38.7%
SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. S-1 (1989-
1996).
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TABLE XII
RANKING BY NUMBER OF MAJORITY OPINIONS WRITTEN
BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 1995, AND AUGUST 1, 1997
Judge (Circuit) Number of
Opinions
Ranking
Landes et al.
Total Influ-
ence Ranking†
Landes et al.
Average Influ-
ence Ranking‡
Richard Posner (7th) 181 1 1 12
Roger Wollman (8th) 133 2 90 171
Joel Flaum (7th) 129 3 9 50
Frank Easterbrook (7th) 127 4 3 25
Kenneth Ripple (7th) 118 5 84 114
C. Arlen Beam (8th) 115 6 93 141
Michael Kanne (7th) 105 7 168 132
Morris Arnold (8th) 103 8 — —
James Loken (8th) 102 9 — —
Pasco Bowman (8th) 101 10 61 118
John Coffey (7th) 101 10 24 112
Ilana Diamond Rovner (7th) 96 12 — —
David Hansen (8th) 95 13 — —
Bruce Selya (1st) 95 13 2 9
Richard Arnold (8th) 91 15 46 116
Diane Wood (7th) 90 16 12 —
Walter Cummings (7th) 89 17 20 40
Daniel Manion (7th) 89 17 83 119
Juan Torruella del Valle (1st) 87 19 37 96
Theodore McMillian (8th) 85 20 19 109
Wade Brorby (10th) 83 21 129 146
Diana Murphy (8th) 80 22 — —
David Thompson (9th) 79 23 113 135
Cornelia Kennedy (6th) 77 24 87 92
David Ebel (10th) 73 25 56 125
† William M. Landes, et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals
Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, tbl.2A (1998).  Table 2A ranks federal appellate judges according to
influence on other circuits.  This ranking is based on the percentage increase (or decrease) in a judge’s
annual citations compared to the number of citations predicted by his tenure, status, and other inde-
pendent variables.  By comparing these coefficients among different judges, the authors ranked judges
by their overall influence.  The citations used were those to signed, published majority opinions of
other federal courts of appeals judges in published (both signed and unsigned) opinions.  The article
examined 205 active and senior judges who had six or more years of tenure by the end of 1995. Our
article, by comparison, examines active judges for a two-year period (August 1, 1995, to August 1,
1997).
‡ Id. at tbl.4A.  Table 4A presents the judge-specific effects for outside citations.  It ranks judges
by average influence per published signed opinion; in other words, the average number of times an
opinion is cited.
GULATI.FMT 04/01/99  5:01 PM
Page 157: Summer 1998] ON NOT MAKING LAW 225
Judge (Circuit) Number of
Opinions
Ranking
Landes et al.
Total Influ-
ence Ranking
Landes et al.
Average Influ-
ence Ranking
Jerry Smith (5th) 71 26 15 48
George Fagg (8th) 70 27 116 163
Sandra Lynch (1st) 70 27 — —
Karen Nelson Moore (6th) 69 29 — —
Robert Parker (5th) 69 29 — —
Ralph Winter, Jr. (2d) 69 29 30 89
Fortunato Benavides (5th) 68 32 — —
Michael Boudin (1st) 68 32 — —
Henry Politz (5th) 68 32 108 139
Betty Fletcher (9th) 66 35 64 76
Amalya Kearse (2d) 66 35 42 18
Patrick Higginbotham (5th) 65 37 26 66
Danny Boggs (6th) 64 38 75 83
Douglas Ginsburg (D.C.) 64 38 128 180
Diarmuid O’Scannlain (9th) 64 38 80 144
Carl Stewart (5th) 64 38 — —
Emilio Garza (5th) 63 42 162 183
John Walker, Jr. (2d) 63 42 33 22
John Duhe, Jr. (5th) 59 44 138 165
Norman Stahl (1st) 59 44 — —
Dennis Jacobs (2d) 58 46 — —
Paul Niemeyer (4th) 58 46 — —
J. Harvie Wilkinson (4th) 58 46 22 49
Stephen Reinhardt (9th) 57 49 95 58
Deanell Tacha (10th) 57 49 130 126
Patrica Wald (D.C.) 57 49 39 27
Paul Kelly Jr. (10th) 56 52 — —
Thomas G. Nelson (9th) 55 53 — —
Jacques Wiener, Jr. (5th) 55 53 115 117
Boyce Martin, Jr. (6th) 54 55 88 105
Andrew Kleinfeld (9th) 53 56 — —
David Sentelle (D.C.) 53 56 132 145
Stephen Trott (9th) 53 56 170 175
Harold DeMoss, Jr. (5th) 52 59 — —
E. Grady Jolly (5th) 51 60 156 162
David Tatel (D.C.) 51 60 — —
Stephen Williams (D.C.) 51 60 76 106
Bobby Baldock (10th) 50 63 117 63
Harry Edwards (D.C.) 50 63 28 46
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Judge (Circuit) Number of
Opinions
Ranking
Landes et al.
Total Influ-
ence Ranking
Landes et al.
Average Influ-
ence Ranking
Gilbert Merritt (6th) 50 63 99 123
Mary Beck Briscoe (10th) 49 66 — —
Melvin Brunetti (9th) 49 66 — —
Robert Henry (10th) 49 66 — —
Joseph McLaughlin (2d) 49 66 — —
Judith Rogers (D.C.) 49 66 — —
Laurence Silberman (D.C.) 49 66 150 185
Edward Becker (3d) 48 72 13 4
Francis Murnaghan, Jr. (4th) 48 72 73 84
Fred Parker (2d) 48 72 — —
Guido Calabresi (2d) 47 75 — —
A. Raymond Randolph (D.C.) 47 75 — —
Stephanie Seymour (10th) 47 75 57 51
Pierre Leval (2d) 46 78 — —
Cynthia Holcomb Hall (9th) 45 79 164 137
David Nelson (9th) 45 79 151 151
Mary Schroeder (9th) 45 79 177 170
Morton Greenberg (3d) 44 82 23 65
William Wilkins, Jr. (4th) 44 82 106 8
Stanley Birch, Jr. (11th) 43 83 179 166
Jose Cabranes (2d) 42 85 — —
Edward Carnes (11th) 42 85 — —
Sam Ervin (4th) 42 85 74 85
Proctor Hug, Jr. (9th) 42 85 147 91
Harry Pregerson (9th) 42 85 154 122
Pamela Ann Rymer (9th) 42 85 100 99
Stephen Anderson (10th) 41 91 134 138
Rosemary Barkett (11th) 41 91 — —
Michael Hawkins (9th) 41 91 — —
Diane Motz (4th) 41 91 — —
Dolores Sloviter (3d) 41 91 43 30
Robert Cowen (3d) 40 96 85 71
J.L. Edmundson (11th) 40 96 161 174
Ferdinand Fernandez (9th) 40 96 71 184
Karen LeCraft Henderson (D.C.) 40 96 — —
Edith Jones (5th) 39 100 102 148
Joseph Hatchett (11th) 38 101 139 136
Alex Kozinski (9th) 38 101 178 157
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Judge (Circuit) Number of
Opinions
Ranking
Landes et al.
Total Influ-
ence Ranking
Landes et al.
Average Influ-
ence Ranking
W. Eugene Davis (5th) 37 103 186 178
Gerald Tjoflat (11th) 36 104 69 23
Richard Nygaard (3d) 35 105 180 133
Clyde Hamilton (4th) 34 106 — —
Alan Norris (6th) 34 106 190 192
J. Michael Luttig (4th) 32 108 — —
Jane Roth (3d) 32 108 — —
James Ryan (6th) 32 108 112 177
Anthony Scirica (3d) 32 108 125 155
Walter Stapleton (3d) 32 108 81 120
Karen Williams (4th) 32 108 — —
Joel Dubina (11th) 31 114 — —
John Porfilio (10th) 31 114 — —
H. Emory Widener, Jr. (4th) 31 114 114 113
R. Lanier Anderson (11th) 30 117 111 67
Carol Los Mansmann (3d) 29 118 120 121
Carlos Lucero (2d) 29 118 — —
Donald Russell (4th) 29 118 47 21
Kenneth Hall (4th) 28 121 148 127
Eugene Siler, Jr. (6th) 28 121 — —
Samuel Alito, Jr. (3d) 27 123 — —
Rhesa Barksdale (5th) 26 124 176 186
Alice Batchelder (6th) 25 125 — —
Timothy Lewis (3d) 25 125 — —
M. Blane Michael (4th) 24 127 — —
Theodore McKee (3d) 21 128 — —
Richard Suhreinrich (6th) 21 128 165 182
Susan Black (11th) 19 130 — —
Emmett Cox (11th) 19 130 169 191
Carolyn King (5th) 18 132 58 115
Martha Craig Daughtrey (6th) 13 133 — —
James Browning (9th) 8 134 172 111
SOURCE: Westlaw searches by authors.
